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THE NEW LOOK AND THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC DISCU^ION OF
MILITARY POLICY
In January 1953, a Republican administration took control of the
Executive Branch of the United States Government bringing with It a commitment
to discover a national strategy better suited to United States' objectives in the
cold war. Th© military policy component of the strateg which was evolved was
the so-called New Look, and like other aspects of cold war strategy , it has re-
ceived extensive polemical treatment. Was It a ''good" policy'* Was it adequate
to future, or even to present needs' Was it too narrow In concept, too inflexible
Such are typical questions publicly raised and publicly answered in connection
with the New Look.
But of perhaps greater significance is a question hitherto unasked and
unanswered: Was the basis for public discussion of this policy factually sufficient
"
What were the official statements, explanations, and Justifications In support of the
For representative discussions of the complex relationship of the
policy of containment, the Korean War, United States military policy, and the
Presidential campaign of 1952, see the following: William Reitzel, Morton A.
Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, United States Foreign Pol icy 1945-1955
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 19$6), pp. 39$-4#V John W7 Spanfer,
American Foreign Policy ??nce World War II (Rev, ed. New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1962), pp. 9^-104; and, particularly, Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Foreign
Policy of the American People (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1961), pp. 266-2^4 and pp. 349-251; and Robert E. Osgood, Limited War











2New look' Did these statements odd up to a comprehensive series of connected
propositions, articulated for maximum public understanding and acceptance?
This is a different matter from that of the policy's substantive merit and it can be
approached simply and directly by analyzing that which was said b> officials in
an official capacity.
This, of course, is not to evade substantive argument. But In the
post-World War II years the substantive merit of United States military policy has
been abundantly and frequently debated in public. Yet, can one pretend that the
time has orrived for a definitive treatment of the subject' It has been tried, of
course, and others too will make early attempts. But so long as Hie true nature of
the mid-twentieth century crisis remains controversial, a final judgement cannot
2
be accorded any important area of America's national strategy of that period.
A definitive treatment requires cm historical perspective.
Thus this thesis will concern Itself with the logic of a policy as it was
presented to the public — both elite public and mass public. But first the question
of public discussion should itself be examined. Should there be continuing public
discussions of national strategic problems?
THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION
2
)n fact there Is good reason to suppose that the controversy as to what
constitutes the crisis which nearly everyone perceives is itself a part of the crisis.
For example, those who associate communism with the crisis would ignore in good
part the difficult problems of the underdeveloped countries; yet these latter problems
constitute the main crisis for many. Obviously, this division of opinion — and
there are other views — reduces capacity to respond and so contributes to the crisis






3Public discussion of great national issues is an accepted blessing of
political life In a democratic state. This is not to say that it is a "good" thing
or that it is necessarily beneficial or that the disucssion is even relevant to the
real issues as seen by those officials responsible for policy decisions.
Great debates and little debates have marked the entire course of
American history from the Jamestown landings in 1607 to the present. The quest
for self-government and an immediate common interest in survival characterized
the years proceeding independence and it can be seen that during that period the
link between individual thought and group action was comparatively direct. Since
independence, that link has for many reasons been lengthened and the impact of
3
individual thought on government action has come to be less direct. Nonetheless,
public discussion is a regular feature of the American political landscape.
Some debates, such as that over the merit of the Constitution of 1787,
have been relatively sophisticated. The Federalist Papgrs attest the intellectual
quality of that debate. But what of the nineteenth century continuous debate over
national expansion? Does the slogan "manifest destiny" have any intellectual
stature? And what of the propaganda campaign that proceeded United States seizure
of the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico? Was it representative of democracy in
action?
Between such extremes there have been numerous other public debates.
3
John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Denvert Allan Swallow,
1927, 1954), Chapter IV and Chapter V. Professor Dewey discusses in depth the









4The nature of the Union was one. The pros and cons of the Versailles Treaty was
one* And, perhaps, somewhere in the middle of the spectrum there is the many-
faceted debate over strategv, policy and goats that has endured since shortly after
the end of World War II. In any event the debates will surely continue m long as
free speech exists and individuals have both the capacity and the inclination for
political expression. The problem then is how to make public discussion more
effective and more responsible. Or, if that is too ambitious, how to moke it less
Irresponsible and how to prevent it from tying the hands of those who must make
5
political decisions.
To this end it is worth noting that public discussion of United States
military polic) is based on two underlying assumptions that are common to dis-
cussion of other areas of public policy as well. First, it is assumed that the public
has both the right and the duty to discuss such matters to better fulfill its role in a
liberal democratic state. This assumption is not challenged here but the foregoing
examples should point up the ne%6 at least to reflect carefully and deeply In each
case. Whether or not there is such a right and/or duty of public discussion should
4
lbld.
Recognition of the problem of the proper role of the public in a demo-
cratic state dates from the elitism of Plato in the fourth century B.C. In the eigh-
teenth century it was the great concern of Rousseau and was reflected In his "General
Will" concept. And today Walter Lippmann finds such philosophical reflection of
the most profound relevance: Public Opinion (New York: Macmillon, 1922, I960)
and Essays In The Public Philosophy (New Tork. Mentor, 1955). At the same time,
this is a pragmatic problem an<i several contemporary works are pertinent to the
area of foreign policy: Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1950, 1960); Charles O. terche, oe.cit.; and







5bo decided in the mind of each citizen and the Implications of such a decision
should be carefully noted. They might not be so apparent as generally believed.
The second assumption underlying public discussion is that the process
necessarily is an enlightening one. There Is an expectation that in raising an
issue in public its true nature will be revealed to the careful scrutiny of the nation,
that opposing views will be accorded their "proper" weights, and that the dialecti-
cal process of public discussion will establish the most desirable course. To believe
that sober public consideration of an issue will lead to the best possible solution Is,
then, under the circumstances, really no more than an affirmation of one's belief
7
in democracy itself.
Again, it is not the purpose of this thesis to challenge the second
assumption any more than the first. Yet, as in the first assumption, there are im-
plications which should trouble even the most democratically minded citizen. For
example, If the process is an enlightening one it stands to reason that this result
can be had only if all relevant factors are considered. But how can one be sure
xippmann, op. cit
., pp. 21-29; And: "The unhappy truth Is that the
prevailing public opinion has been destructively wrong at the critical junctures. ...
Mass opinion has acquired mounting power In this century. It has shown itself to be
a dangerous master of decisions when the stakes are life and death.' (pp. 23-24).
^Dewey. op. cit. , Chapter IV, "The Eclipse of the Public." But the
"public" of Professor Dewey is a democratic community — I.e., a communicating
public. For a contradictory belief, see Lippmann, op. cit
., pp, 36-3^: "Cannot
a multitude of voters be regarded as the practical equivalent of all the people
They cannot be." (p. 37). But on pp. 102-103, Lippmann quotes with favor C. S«
Pelrce to the effect that "Human opinion universally tends in the long run to a
definite form, which is the truth." The difference is that In the second instance a
"rational procedure" employed in the context of a "public philosophy" guides,




6that oil such factors are In the open?
Again, Issues can be Isolated In discussion hut In Implementation they
lose this beautiful clarity of focus and must be integrated into a world that is hope*
lessly relative* Thus, how can one discuss an issue in depth without a total famili-
arity with other issues as well"
Still another point is the inescapable fact that people are different in
their intellectual capacities, their inclinations, their experiences, and their needs.
How then can a meaningful public discussion take place simultaneously at all levels
of political sophistication? On occasion, Jesus spoke in parables ami there are
those who say his purpose was to communicate in the same breath with the different
e
levels of his audiences — the masses and the educated elites. But the attempts of
politicians, officials, and interest groups to follow suit Is more characterized by
9
inane example, too-simple analog), and the misleading slogan or catch-phrase.
Singly or collectively these are not substitute for intelligent and informed discussion;
they only make such discussion that much more difficult.
The thoughtful democrat will be worried, too, by the knowledge that
the common interest rarely can muster organized support comparable to that enjoyed
by special interests. For the factor of organization can easily affect the course of





., pp. 132f. But the first part of Chapter IV, "The
Eclipse of the Public, " treats with the general frustration of communication between
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7as well as by government propaganda agencies and information activities.
A final cause for pause has particular relevance to discussion of
military or strategic matters: the possibility that — for reasons deemed good and
sufficient by responsible officials — pertinent information may be withheld arKJi
thereby greatly alter the substance of conclusions. For example, in discussing
contemporary military policy, a condition of mutual invulnerability of nuclear
striking forces, if it existed, could have a decisive effect on policy decisions.
Yet, the existence or non-existence of such a situation has at times been a classi-
fied subject. Thus one pole of public discussion might conceivably be separated
from another by an opposite assumption — that mutual invulnerability does or does
not exist. The discussion is accordingly meaningless.
In the same vein, Henry Kissinger's recent work, The Necessity for
Choice, is a highly regarded analysis of strategy and military policy alternatives.
Yet, presumably, because of his unfamiliarity with some factual data bearing on
relative United States-'ovlet military strength he confused his brilliant theoretical
models with a reality that was substantially different. Ar** bear ln m{nd thIs
The United States Congress recognizes the implications of this pro-
blem to the extent that government agencies are forbidden by law from expending
funds for public information activities in behalf of pending or sought for legislation*
Nonetheless, the vast resources of a government agency or department are regularly
devoted to marshalling material for support of legislative programs and this material
reaches the public as a result of subsequent public hearings. c ee the published
records of hearings on almost any major bill such as Foreign Aid of Military Applica-
tions.
Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York: Anchor
Books, 1960, 1962), Chapter II, "The Dilemmas of Deterrence." In Chapter I, on
pp. 15-16, he states: "For aU the heat of the controversy, it is important to note
that there is no dispute about the missile gap as such. It is generally admitted that
-»i
torfl b*fi .. ; i :<....* | || H , I hn M qon »!Jt*im «H tuodi - , r , .., .->•
8book hod a considerable impact on the public.
Obviously, neither the first nor the second assumption can be easily
tested* The validitv of the idea that public discussion is In itself revealing or that
it is beneficial or that it is necessary is too much related to basic political con-
victions, to persona* values, and to time-honored precedent.
One might osk, "What side effects would the restriction of public dis-
cussion have on the vitality of our democratic process^" Undoubtedly the 1- would
be large. But how large • And of what specific character? Is it the discussion
which is beneficial or is it the "truth" which might emerge from discussion ? This
may never be known objectively. Nearly twenty-four hundred years ago Pericles
told the Athenians that ". . .the great impediment to action is. . .not discussion, but
12
the want of that knowledge which is gained by discussion preparatory to action.'
But who is to say that he was right or that what was good procedure for a tiny cit -
state has the same virtue for a country so large and pluralistic as the United c tates
In the former case it would have been not unreasonable to expect some
from 1961 until at least the end of 1964 the rovlet Union will possess more missiles
than the United "totes." A reviewer for the Washington Post , Chalmers M. Roberts,
stated that "This is a book, perhaps the book, for the beginning of the Kennedy
Administration." ( runday, 13 January 1961, p. E-7). But another reporter for the
same newspaper, John G. Norris, stated less than three weeks later that a study by
the new administration hod revealed no evidence ". . .that any 'missile gap' exists
today.'' (Tuesday, 7 February 1961, p. A-1). Obviously, herein lies cause for
sober reflection.
12
In the "Funeral Oration" as recorded in Thucydides, History of the







9sort of consensu! to emerge; in the latter, it would be unrealistic to expect such
a result because of the great diversity of interests, values, and intellectual abilities.
Nonetheless, Pericles' advice is still good democratic dogma and a commitment
binding on all United ~tates administrations, whatever their political party and
irrespective of whether or not they believe the dogma.
Thus, there is much to keep in mind when engaging in public discussion.
Certainly it does not in itself ensure democratic results. And acceptance of the
assumptions that it is a right and/or a duty and that it Is an enlightening process
cannot render the ne<sd for o skeptical attitude less compelling.
There is one final note of caution in approaching this subject:
In any effort of the Government to communicate its alms to the public
or to set the stage tor public discussion it is altogether too easy to conclude that
greater effort, more data, and undiluted condor could render the process more effec-
tive in terms of democratic results. This, too, is not questioned. But this may not
be possible to accomplish — ot laast, not to the extent necessary — and wishing
simply will not change this fact. The reservations expressed above with respect to
the second assumption are reasons, for example, why such a prescription might be
impossible to fulfill.
The New Look^iUfory police was a development bound ciosely to the
13
See, for example, LIppmann, op. cit
., p. 42. This whole volume
Is relevant to the question of the role of the publi^but Chapter IV, "The Public
Interest," Is particularly thought-provoking. And Reitzel, op. cir ., p. c<3 describes
public debate as a "characteristic American political process."
'
10
logic of ©vents that proceeded it. To illustrate its relationship to the complex
whole of United States strategy and foreign policy it is necessary at this point to
trace the course of events and policy from the closing months of World War il




THE POST WORLD WAR II TREND OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN AND
MILITARY POLICY
I. THE BACKGROUND OF CONTAINMENT
Hiitori col Chronology
The strategy of containment envisaged worldwide application from its
inception. However, from the closing months of the European phase of World War
II until the outbreak of warfare In Korea in 1950, the geographic areas which were
most directly related to the strategy were Central and Eastern Europe and the so~
2
called Northern Tier States of the Middle East.
As the European war was being brought to conclusion, the United
States found Itself at war not only with Germany but also with Italy, Hungary,
Bulgaria, and Rumania. Except for Italy, these states were Axis satellites. Italy,
This Is implied by the wording of the Truman Doctrine (see footnote II)
and the argument presented b> George Kennan in his article "The Sources of coviet
Conduct" (see footnote 13); for an opinion to the effect that neither General Marshall
nor Dean Acheson appreciated the global nature of the struggle against communism
see William H. Chamberlin, Beyond Containment (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1953),
p. S3. The term "containment" was the popular identification given the conceptual
framework of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. It stems from Kennan's
statements that Soviet pressure "can be contained" by counterforce and that " the
main element of any United States policy towa rd the Soviet Union must be that of. .
.
containment of Russian expansive tendencies." See footnotes 13 and 40 below. The
Quotations appear on p. 99 of the article as reprinted In American Diplomacy .
2
However, the developments In China during the years 1946-1949 be-
came a matter of Increasing concern to the United States Government; but, the
record suggests that at least in the beginning the situation was viewed officially as
primarily a Chinese domestic tragedy. ree United States Department of State, United
States Relotlons With China 1944-1949 (Washington: Government Printing Office,









ttolsme^D cwwwtaA nosO ten
ddimtrtD ,H n
...
* v'. £ tlif * j'>\ ItlBfl
;i't f | : •,, i i '. .V ;-f! Vi tog
12
a former Axis partner, had surrendered to the Allies, reorganized Its government,
and entered the war on the side of the Allies. Austria was technically a part of
Germany Itself. Poland, Csechesiovakla, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Albania
were members of the Allies, the wartime United Nations; they had been d^feattd
and occupied, in whole or In part, by Germany, had established governments In
exile and/or resistance movements, and had been freed by changes in the fortunes
of war.
The task of reconstituting the states of Centra! and Eastern Europe had
been before the Allies for some time. There were differences of opinion as to how
this should be done and the European Advisor-' Commission had been unable to re-
4
solve these differences. However, at Yelto In February 1945, the Big Three (the
United States, Great Britain, and the *oviet Union) reached what appeared to be
an understanding. In the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Conference there was
contained the M Declaration on Liberated Europe," by which Is was agreed that the
United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union would
jointly assist the p*opl? In any. . .former Axis satellite state in
Europe... to form Interim governmental authorities broadly repre-
sentative of all democratic element?. In the population ond
pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free
3
Italy, under Marshal) Sadoglio, had signed an armistice with the
Allies on 3 September 1943 and had declared war on Germany 13 October 1943.
Mussolini bad been deposed 25 June 1943.
At least part of these difficulties were due to the lack of "substantive
detail*1 In formal Allied plans, ^ee William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and
Constance G. Coblenz, United ctotes foreign Policy 1945-1935 (Washington;














election of governments responsive to the will of the people.
The sticky problem of which of two Polish governments appeared to
be resolved in an agreement that the USSR-sponsored Polish Provisional Govern-
ment (the Lublin Poles) would take in elements of the (London) Polish Government-
in-exile and rename itself the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.
This last was done; the name of the government was changed* But to the USSR,
whose troops were in occupation of Eastern and Central Europe up to the Elbe
River in Germany, the issue of broadening the base of the Polish government was
apparently nevar seriously considered.
in July 1945, at the Potsdam Conference, the Polish matter was again
discussed but the Allies lacked politically relevant leverage and Stalin would not
7
budge. Thus, all of Eastern Europe c *d much of Central Europe was occupied by
troops of the USSR . There was Four-Power occupation In Germany and Austria.
And Czechoslovakia had installed its government-in-exile as the United States with-
drew its troops.
In the "outh, Yugoslavia and Albania were In the grasp of Communist
partisans and shortly to become Communist states. The govemment-in-exlle which
^United States Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. 12. (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1945), p. 215.
United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
rates; The Conferences at Malta an<i Yalta, 1945 (Washington; Govemmenf
Printing Office, 1955), p. 973; also Chomberlin, op. cir., pp. 37-40.
7

















had returned to Greece Had difficulties from the start both because of its narrow
base of popular support and because of the political activity of Communist partisan
groups. Even if Soviet motives and intentions were pure, the stark reality of the
political imbalance In which one nation controlled so much land and so many peo-
ple in a strategical! important part of the world was not unlike tempting the devil.
Men of political experience had good cause to fear the worst.
The year 1946 brought Soviet expansionist designs into the open so far
as diplomats were concerned. The difficulties in maintaining any type of accord
between the Great Powers made it impossible to implement important provisions of
the wartime agreements. But at the end of the year the only outright Communist
states in Central Europe were Albania and Yugoslavia.
In February 1947, peace treaties were signed by the Allies with the
former Axis satellites of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. Each treaty guaranteed
human rights, limited the armed forces, and guaranteed the free and open navigation
of the Danube River. But each of these states was also occupied by military forces
of the USSR and by the end of the year each had a Communist government, "o
had Poland. In a coup d'etat, Communism was imposed on Czechoslovakia in
February 1948.
Meanwhile, in Southeast Europe, the difficulties of the Greek govern-
ment hod by the end of 1946 erwpfad Into open civil warfare between the weak















from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. Great Britain, which had traditionally
considered It a matter of vital interest that Russia be kept out of the Mediterranean
and the Middle East and which had been supporting and assisting the Greek and
Turkish governments in their efforts to resist Communist pressure, had by the end of
10
1946 reached the limits of Its ability to support either Greece or Turkey.
The United States was informed of this critical development in February
1947 and in March the Truman Doctrine was announced. Thus the United States
undertook a responsibility that had from its outset a long term outlook. What had
been until that time a series of reactions to developments on an ad hoc basis
crystallized into a broader concept which was stated in terms of support for freedom
12
against totalitarian subjugation — by direct or indirect means. In July the whole
13
broad concept was described brilliantly as a strategy of containment.
However, unilateral action by the United c totes appeared not to be a
means greatly feared by the UC SR. Utilizing national Communist parties in France
and Italy, the Soviet Union was able to impede and threaten the reconstruction effort
9Chamberlln, op. clt.
, pp. 55ff. ibid.
The "Truman Doctrine" Is the identification given President Truman's
address to Congress on 12 March 1947 in which he requested authority to aid and
assist Greece and Turkey. Because it purported to rest on a principle rather th ->n a
specific set of circumstances it became known as a doctrine. For text of message
see Deportment of "tote Bulletin, Vol. 16, pp. 829-S32.
Reltzel, op. clt.
,
p. P6; Chamberlln, op. clt. , pp. 293f.
13 X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXV
(July 1947), pp. 566-5£2. ">'" was subsequently identified as George F. Kennan,
Chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff.
'•
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jus* started under the Marshal I Plan. What was needed was a real symbol of
Western unity. This took shape by evolution from the Anglo-Frsnch alliance of
March 1947, to the Brussels Pact of March 194? which Incorporated the BENELUX
states, to the NATO treaty of April 1949.
At the same time as plans for NATO were being developed, the United
c totes was pushing Its proposals for a new Wast German State. The Soviet Union
reacted to this last by imposing on Western Berlin a blockade of all surface access
routes from June 194P to May 1949. But the blockade was lifted when it failed to
15
prevent th® creation of the now West German State. It now could be seen that






nesfs of the Containment Strategy
As the fortunes of World War II began to favor the Allies, their atten-
tion was directed to the practical aspects of reorganizing the European continent
after the war was over. This is 'fully documented elsewhere. However, It U worthy
of note that general policies and arrangements first began to flow from th<? Moscow
Conference (of Foreign Ministers) in October 1943 and the Teheran Conference of
Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin held In November and December of the same yoar.
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17
each of the Big Three to work out technical political arrangements of liberation
and occupation.
The Conferences at Yalta In February 1945 and Potsdam in July 1945
were primarily concerned with these same political matters. But by the time of the
IB
Yalta Conference, Allied interests were not In accord. Despite the fact that
the United c tates had no vital interests in Eastern and Central Europe, it was
bound by the principles of the Atlantic Charter and these it sought to uphold by
19
seeking specific agreements and a general Allied unity.
There seemed to be agreement among ranking United ^tates policy-
makers that the prospects for democratic government in the areas through which the
Russian army was advancing had to be keyed to a viable Big Three unity. Thus, in
retrospect It is evident that much more was taken for granted with respect to the
good intentions of the Soviet Union than, perhaps,, was justified in the evsnl. For
if the Soviet had sought from Germany, during their two year alliance from 1939-
»"By February 1945, ^talln's armies were completely removed from
Russian soil and fighting the Germans in Eastern Europe. His political power was
thus strongly enhanced by military presence.
19
John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy r \nce World War II
(Rev. ed., New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960, 1962), pp. 14-18. ^panier
quotes a wartime American intelligence estimate on the likely postwar political
situation in Europe: "With Germany crushed, there Is no power in Europe to
oppose her tremendous military forces. . . . The conclusions from the foregoing are
obvious, ^ince Russia is the decisive factor in the war, she must be given every
assistance, and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship. Likewise, since
without question she will dominate Europe on the defeat of the Axis, it is even more
essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations with Russia." (p. 14).

















1941, spheres of Influence and territorial gains that were In Hie same general areas
In which Germany's interests hod lain, could it appear reasonable that having fought
a war in which her own losses were of near catastrophic proportion Russia would In
20
the face of an absence of credible resistance reduce Its pretensions
In any case, rather than crack down over the West-Soviet Union dis-
agreements discussed at Yalta and Potsdam and thereby risk upsetting what the United
States believed was the whole — and the only —• basis for o satisfactory post-war
period, the effort was made to preserve a spirit of goodwill — a spirit which perhaps
21
did not exist at that time. But slowly, as the series of events came to be viewed
as a continuum, the United c totes was jarred Info an awareness of the realities of
22
international politics.
There had been the difficulties in the European Advisory Commission as
to whether the governments-in-exile represented the people in the liberated areas.
Specifically this was brought to a head In the controversy over the Polish government.
In the occupied states of Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Austria and
^ The Molotov-Rlbbentrop agreement of 24 August 193°, by a secret
protocol to a non-aggression treaty, divided Eastern Europe into Germany and
Russian spheres of influence. During the ensuing two years the U^SR 'consolidated'
its spheres in a manner that greatly irritated the Germans. Finally, in November
1940 the USSR preited for o set of demands to recognize their additional Interests
In the Balkans, Bulgaria, the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, and the area south of
the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. See George F. Kerman, Russia and the West
Under lennin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960, 1961;, pp. 335-344.
21
Spanler, op. elt. , op, 14-19; Relteel, op. cit. , pp. $3-85.
22
Charles O. lerche, Foreign Policy of the American People (2nd ed.,





Germany the Allied Control Councils which hod been established to administer the
occupation in consonance with the broader political agreements rapidly became In-
23
effective In the absence of the required unanimity. ' In the first three of the
above states, this ineffectiveness left the Soviet army of occupation free to «stab-
24
llsh policy and obstruct the carrying out of the Yalta pledges. There was the
Communist assistance to the Greek guerrillas. There were strong Soviet notes to
25
Turkey and Iran, each demanding intolerable concessions. There was the break-
down of East-West cooperation In Germany. There was an utter disregard for what
the West held to be the spirit of the Yalta "Declaration on Liberated Europe,
"
particularly evidenced by the Soviet removals of equipment and machinery from Its
zones of occupation.
Winston Churchill was not the only one to doubt coviet post-war
intentions; there were others too. But surely his wartime concerns for post-war
Europe were most important and are particularly well -documented. And his speech
at Fulton, Missouri on 5 March 1946 is the landmark event that dramatically gave
the whole series of events a publicly meaningful perspective. He urged nan Anglo-
American alliance to protect Christian civilization from the Soviet menace, to break
the 'Iron curtain' and ultimately to liberate the peoples enslaved by Communist
23





, pp. 87, 2H, 21 r ; Spanier, op. clt. , pp. 20f.
26
Reitzel, op. clt., pp. P6f.
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However, the United States continued to react to ^ach instance of
Soviet provocation a$ though it were a thing apart. This Is not to say that recog-
nition was slow to down on United States officials; It h only that changing old
habits and policies takes time. Also despite the fact that the reservoir was fast
draining, there was still a considerable residue of the goodwill accumulated In
the course of pursuing a common cause.
There were those whose assessments of the International political scene
were the opposite of Mr. Churchill's: Henry Wallace, President Truman's Secretary
of Commerce, for example, had this outlook and saw in British diplomacy and
baiance-of-power politics all that was wrong with the world. In September 1946
he made a speech In New York that was not only critical of the British but also
proposed a United States-Soviet entente, observing: ,:We should recognise that we
have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in
29
the political affairs of Latin America, Western Europe, and the USA."
Mr. Wallace at least showed a poor sense of timing Inasmuch as Secretary
of ^tate Byrnes, for more than a year, had been reacting to Soviet violations of
Allied agreements by efforts to gain fulfillment of the Yalta pledges with respect to
Eastern Europe. United States' policy was beginning to take the form of a new
27
Frederick I. Schuman. International Politics (6th ed., New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1958), p. 595.
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"
"Reltzel, op. eit. , Chapter V is an interesting discussion of the con-
siderations involved In changing the direction of policy at that time.
29
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strategic concept, however slow the process. The following quotation from a
Brookings publication puts it weli:
Generally speaking (the) . • .development (of an Anglo-
American solidarity) did not lead to an official formulation
of an extreme alternative assumption, namely, that the
Soviet Union constituted a threat to the security of the
United States. Even iess was such a conclusion understand-
able to public opinion . But the signs of Soviet intransigence
were not ignored, and they gradually became common know-
ledge . A range of interpretations of Soviet behavior was
built up. Consequently, the characteristic American politi-
cal process of pubiiciy debating a national position was
initiated. A working consensus was not reached until 1947.
In the meantime within the State Department a new policy was under
development that was both specific and conceptual . It was discussed favorably at
a Cabinet meeting on 25 September 1946 and was later to become known as the
31
Truman Doctrine. It advocated aid to friendly countries with the apparent pur-
32
pose of containing the spread of Communism.
In February 1947, when Britain informed the United States that it couid
not furnish aid and support to Greece and Turkey beyond March, the time had
arrived for announcing the new policy. This was done on 12 March in the form of
the Truman Doctrine, a message to Congress which requested $400,000,000 to aid
the above two countries. But the importance of the message lay in recognition of
the much broader principle involved — H . . .that it must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
30Reitzei, op. cit.






minorities or by outside pressures. . . . "' Britain and the United States had been
containing Communist power until that time on an ad hoc basis. Now that policy
had taken on the aspects of a brood concept.
In July of the some year its conceptual nature was more fully expounded
and, In addition, its comprehensive nature was made more clear. This was the
result of the publication of the article, "Sources of Soviet Conduct, " later revealed
34
to hove been written by ^tote Department official George F. Kennan.
Thus the strategy of containment was born.
II. THE STRATEGY DF CONTAINMENT
There are no other phases of statecraft in which the necessity of satis-
fying theoretical and conceptual purpose is more pertinent than In the formulation
of national strategy. Additionally, the strategy formulated must pass the same tests
or practicality and pragmatic purpose that are applied to ail policies and .vhich are
determinant of their political success. At the same time, it must be remembered
that strategy, no less than policy, is applied to dynamic situations which change
in character with the passage of time and with the appearance of new variables.
Thus, continuous review is required to make sure that the original concepts are still
applicable and to determine what policy is needed to implement the strategy.
With the advantage of historical perspective we are able to look back
3Ouoted in Thomas P. Brockway, Basic Documents in United States
Foreign Policy (Princeton: D. Von Nostrand Co., Inc., 1957), p. 151.
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on the strategy of containment and compare the contingencies envisaged in its
concept to those tested by event. First, however, it is necessary to examine the
strategy itself in some detail
.
The Eariy Years: 1947- 1952
The case for the Truman Doctrine had been argued in terms of support
for the United Nations Charter. President Truman had said:
The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting
freedom and independence for ail its members. We shaii
not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing
to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and
their national integrity against aggressive movements that
see* to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. . .
.
Then he went on to add:
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States
to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation
by armed minorities or by outside pressures. . .
.
The world in not static, and the status quo is not sacred.
But we can not allow changes in the status quo in violation
of the Charter of the United Nations ay such methods as coer-
cion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In
helping free and Independent nations to maintain their freedom,
the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations. . . .«,
Earlier in his address Prerfdent Truman had noted that the United States
had taken the lead in establishing the United Nations in order * . . .to insure the
37
peaceful development of nations, free from coercion ....**







Thus, certotn objectives were set forth and, concurrently, the justi-
fication for seeking those objectives. But this was not a strategy, it did not
articulate In any broad sense a theory of causes and effects; It did not unify the
separate responses to separate events under the doctrine; nor did It set forth a con-
cept of purpose that explained just what net effect the doctrine would have on the
United States' position in the world, say, several years after. Finally it lacked
an analysis of the state of international politics and of the effects of historical
forces and trends.
But this is not fair criticism; a message to Congress is no place to attempt
communication with the elite mind Inasmuch as the circumstances usually are such
that the true audience is the public at large rather than the members of the two
Houses jointly assembled.
However, several months later the Intellectual case was presented, in
a magazine of elite appeal, as an article by an unidentified but high ranking United
States* official. The authority for the article Is now undoubted and the article
thelf remains as the single best exposition of the strategy.
The author, George F. Kennan, started his article with a frank attempt
to psychoanalyze "the political personality of Soviet power'' In terms of Ideology
and circumstance. This he felt a necessary prerequisite to effective counter-action.
His ensuing analysis is scholarly and persuasive. But one might uestfon If It was
really necessary. Effective diplomacy has traditionally assumed that agreements and




understandings depend an a quid pro quo rather than an absence of Hostile Intent.
And, that objective factors determine state policies. Psychoanalysis might, In
fact, cause one to confuse an adversary's desires or aims with those other courses
that circumstance might be dictating. But a greater danger is a simple one: the
accuracy of the findings cannot be assured. On the other hand, If the results of the
analysis are used merely as a basis for additional insight Into the Soviet character
30
and motivations they can give obvious advantage to the holder.
In any ey^nf, Kennan's analysis led him to two concepts each having
broad Implications. The first was that of an "Innate antagonism between capitalism
40
and socialism, which accounted for their hostility and suspicion. The second
was "the Infallibility of the Kremlin," which gave rise to "Iron discipline" and the
41
"tactical thesis." He found that the Kremlin was not on a time table and was In
fact a very conservative international actor. Thus Soviet ideology allowed them to
act rationally, as in retreating in the face of superior force, if they always main-
42
talned "pressure, Increasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal."
From the foregoing, Kennan deduced that "the main element of any
United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient
39
Cf.j Walter lippmann, The Cold War (New York: Harper and Bros.,
Inc., 1947), p. 60. "The history of diplomacy is the history of relations among
rival powers, which did not anjoy politico! Intimacy, and (which} did not respond
to appeals to common purposes.
"
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but firm ond vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." This seems
fair enough; but the question any diplomat should ask is, "Is this not also the main
element of a policy towards any international bad-actor of considerable strength,
irrespective of ideology "' "
The heart of the strategy of containment is contained in the following
passage:
It will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free
institutions of the Western World is something that can be contained
by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series
of constantly shifting geographical and political points, correspon-
ding to the shifts and maneuvers of ^oviet policy, but which cannot
be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward
to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they hov.
scored great successes. . .
.
But If ideology convinces the rulers of Pussla that truth is on
their side and that they can therefore afford to wait, those of us
on whom that ideology has no claim are free to examine objectively
the validity of that premise. The Soviet thesis not only implies
complete lack of control by the West over its own economic destiny,
it likewise assumes Russian unity, discipline and patience over an
infinite period. Lat us bring this apocalyptic vision down to earth,
and suppose that the Western world finds the strength and resource-
fulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years.
What does that spell for Russia Itself"
44
Thus the strategy provided an objective for the West in meeting roviet
pressure: that is, containment of Soviet power. At the same time, the framework
within which policy was to be made stated how Soviet pressure was to be met: that
is, by counterforce. But counterforce was to be used in such a way that the entire
scope of Western relation*, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was to be considered in deter-
mining a response — a concept which unified isolated events and required that they
^Kennan, op. clt





be treated in relation to the whole; counterfores could thus be "geographical or
political !> ; it netwi not be of the same kind and amount nor in the same location.
This last gave flexibility to the West allowing it to use weapons, such as its strong,
diverse economy or its industrial plant, in which it was superior.
Perhaps, the greatest point in favor of the strategy was its deliberate
use of the same weapon that the Soviet purported to have in monopoly: that is,
the concept of time as an element in favor of the West. This last received consider-
able attention from Kennan and he listed many reasons why he felt that it was so.
He admitted, however, that he could not prove it. Nor could it be disproved.
"But/' he wrote, "the possibility remains... that Soviet power, like the capitalist
world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that the
4J
sprouting of these seeds is well advanced." This indicated an element of poli-
tical determinism in Kennan 's thought; however, the policy did not stand or fail on
this point.
Obviously Kennan did not think of the strategy as "negative. " As a
diplomat of experience he knew that International relations was oriented about
the quid pro quo and other objective factors, such as relevant strength. But con-
tainment did not affect these; it merely introduced additional incentives to ensure
that the Soviet respected that arrangement. Positive results could be expected, too,
If the United States were to take the initiative. Kennan stated, 'It is entirely
possible for the United States to influence by its actions the Internal developments,
45
!b!d., p. 104.






both within Russia and throughout the International Communist movement...."
But this required that the United c tates
. . .create among peoples of th« world generally the im-
pression of a country which knows what it wants, which is
coping successfully with the problems of Its internal life and
with the responsibilities of a World Power, and which has a
spiritual vitality capable of holding its own among the major
ideological currents of the time. j 7
Eventually, the results of containment would be "either the break-up
or the gradual mellowing of coviet power." In Kennan's mind, "There was never
49
a fairer test of national quality. ..."
From the outset, containment had its critics. Walter Lippmann took Issue
with it in positive terms. It conceded, he said, the Initiative; it placed primary
emphasis on weak peripheral states rather than on the Atlantic community; It was es-
tablished on an unprovable and flimsy premise that Communism contained 'the seeds
of its own decay"; it was expensive In manpower which we had not while emphasizing
least the sources of our strength; and it required a flexibility of response unattainable
in democratic society.
It almost seems that Mr. Lippmann was deliberately misinterpreting the
Kennan article. Nowhere did Kennan state or imply that containment was to be sub-
stituted tor any positive American purposes that might appear.
Nor can one find justification In Mr. LJppmonn's statement that "Mr.
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Soviet power. . .bears within Itself the seeds of Its own decay. ..." The predic-
tion was optimistic; but it was an additional and not a dependent conclusion. In
actuality the flexibility of the response was designed to ovoid just the squandering
of manpower that Mr. lippmann said it would entail; physical containment on the
periphery was slmplv an uninspired mode of implementation; although, to an extent
It was unavoidable.
But there was one criticism that came home to roost. Despite all the
fervor with which the United States fought the cold war, understanding of its purpose
and sympathy for the restricted areas of choice ne\/&r Reached the level that would
provide the high degree of flexibility on which success of the policy relied.
During the three years until the start of the Korean War, a rudimentary
form of containment appears to have been United States policy. Soviet power was
contained, not completely, but sufficiently to indicate that it would be done. In
the process, containment became a two-edged sword and the confrontation stabilized
Itself into a bi-polar concept. In fact, using only the shallowest meaningAor vir-
tually unlimited intensification of the cold war. Thus, for a period, no clear
objectives, other than to be against things Russian, could be distinguished. Archibald
Mac Lelsh writing In 1949 observed: "Resistance to the Russians became on end and
object In itself. And the result was a declaration of political bankruptcy such as
52few agreat nations In the course of history have ever confessed to."
51 ibid., p. 11.
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In addition, there was criticism that containment was negative because
53
it did not actively seek to destroy Communism or to free the captive peoples.
This view gradually gained adherence until aided by the frustrations of the Korean
War it was taken up in the political campaign of 1952 by the Republican part).
As it was employed, containment was negative. That is, the United
States simply reacted to Kremlin moves by physicallv encircling the Soviet Union
with a network of bases ond alliances. Whether or not American counterfarce could
have been more imaginative is not here argued. It suffices to observe that the threat
of expanding Communism was met and deadlock resulted. But this was not expected.
Charles O. Lerche explains that "...The theorists of containment had anticipated
stalemate as the most porbable outcome of the first phase of American action and
54
had devised a strategy to follow up any success the United 'totes might enjoy. ..."
"The second phase, " Professor Lerche adds,
...called for the United States to exploit Its own advantages,
to capitalize on the difficulties inherent In the Soviet position,
and ultimately (emphasis suppltetD to confront the Kremlin with
such an unfavorable situation that peaceful accommodation with
the free world would be Hie only convenient way tor the leader-
ship to escape with the regime Intact...
The trouble was that while He second phase was conceptually appealing
it turned on the sophistication of the American public for its support. And since
sophistication was hardly an apt description of that public the policy can be said to
similar criticism of the American reaction to Russian intransigence.
53
For example James Burnhom,
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hove been misconceived. Indeed, a significant portion of the public rejected the
very objective of the second phase — that Is, peaceful accommodation of Russia
with the free world.
The Eisenhower-Dulles Revisions
Perhaps containment was too sophisticated to be understood by the public
in more than its obvious application to the physical holding back of the spread of
Communism. For what was originally a "popular" policy was by the summer of 1952
57
a symbol of cold war frustration.
There was the feeling that in pursuing containment the United States was
acquiescing In the Soviet subjugation of Eastern Europe and the other "captive
nations." Interest groups played a part In the buildup of this attitude, but in 1952
58
It became a political football.
Then, the Republican Party introduced the concept of liberation into the
campaign to elect Eisenhower that fall; Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam were denounced
to the extent that they Implied United States acquiescence in the status of subjugation.
Liberation was to be accomplished by a "roll-back" of Communism from Central and
Eastern Europe. It was reasoned that this could be done by creating United States'
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factor although to portions of the United States public, liberation meant forceful
59
ejection of the Communist*.
At this point It might be well to look again at the original concept of
containment to see what it hod envisaged.
First of all containment was to be a Song term affair, or so it seemed.
Kennan had mentioned 10 to 15 years which In retrospect seems very brief indeed.
But to the onlookers of 1947-1952, 10 to 15 years seemed far away.
Secondly, containment had an objective: that of bringing about con-
ditions within the Soviet Union under which the United r totes and the Soviet Union
would be able to effect an accommodation, or modus vivendi .
Thirdly, there were the two aspects — to physically contain the Soviet
Union and, to the extent possible, create "situations of strength" from which the
United States could force the Soviet to retreat.
Fourth, there was the premise that in the application of counterforce to
Soviet pressure, the application would be flexible as to character and location.
Fifth, there was the obvious need for patience and imagination In pur-
suit of containment. Success was to be measured on a net gain basis and not by
sheer numerology.
Finally, there was the one great rule — avoid war. The key to the
whole strategy was the belief that the Soviet Union's actions were those of an oppor-
tunistic dictatorship seeking to hold onto and to expand Its power, and that the
59ibid.








leader* of this dictatorship were rational
.
It is surprising then that liberation was considered a departure from
containment. True, it accentuated the positive where all that was apparent in 1952
was the success of the negative aspects of containment. But the "positive" aspect
of liberation was also present in containment. For the physical containment was
simply the sine qua non for creating Hie situations of strength by which Hie 5ovIet
could be forced to retreat. When considered from the political standpoint, however,
It Is clearly evident that the public dissatisfaction with "negative containment" could
best be exploited by changing the name to something more positive while keeping
60
the essential features substantially the same.
Public dissatisfaction with containment would be hard to prove by the
results of the election of 1952 because there were so many other subjective factors
involved. Eisenhower was a popular hero; the Korean War was dragging interminably;
and it had been twenty years since the Republicans had had a President. Irrespective
of this, however, there Is evidence that containment vs. liberation was one of the
major issues of the campaign. As Spanler writes;
. . .The country desperately wanted a more vigorous and forth-
right anti-Communist policy that promised an «n6 to the cold war.
At Hie same time, it was unprepared to take the risks involved:
that Is, a policy which actively sought the liberation of the
satellite states would have to accept the very definite risk of all-
out war with the Soviet Union. In these circumstances, the only
king of dynamism the country could afford was a verbal dynamism.
And this was all the people seemed to want. . .
.^j
* ^panier, op. clt.
, p. 101t "...the policy of liberation seems to have
been devised primarily to roll back the Democrats In the United ^tates, not the Red
Army In Eastern Europe."
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It seems fair to conclude that the depth and breadth of the concept of
containment had been most inadequately presented to the public, that they were
not prepared for the patience and the flexibility that the approach demanded, and
that they had not been conditioned to the expectation that there would be some
Communist gains in the process of gaining a more decisive position for the United
States. As noted, the frustration of the Korean War exacerbated the effect on the
public. 62
Thus on 20 January 1953, a new administration took office with a public
record of having condemned the idea of "negative containment." How ft visualized
the liberation concept was shortly evidenced in the various public pronouncements
with respect to the captive peoples.
On 27 January 1953 Secretary Dulles addressed the nation and said, In
part:
Now the other purpose of our foreign policy, and this is the
positive aspect, must be to create in other peoples such a love
and respect for freedom that they can never really be absorbed by
the despotism, the totalitarian dictatorship, of the Communist
world. ... A great deal can be done to make these peoples,
these captive peoples, retain such a love of freedom and inde-
pendence, and to bring such a love and determination to keep
independence on the part of these peoples. . .who are menaced,
that they can't be swallowed and digested by Soviet communism.
And perhaps in time this indigestion will become so acute that it
might be fatal. ,*
President Eisenhower in his first State of the Union Message on 2 February
62 lbld., p. 98— oia to.
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1953 denounced in general terms the various wartime agreements where they per-
tained to extending "oviet domination. Ha said:
We shall never acquiesce in the enslavement of any people
in order to purchase fancied gain for ourselves, f shall ask the
Congress at a later date to join in an appropriate resolution making
clear that this government recognizes no kind of commitment con-
tained in secret understandings of the past with foreign governments
which permit this kind of enslavement.^
However, there was a part of the public to whom liberation metant
fairly Imminent physical liberation — inasmuch as the concept had been presented
as a cure for the ills of containment. Thus interest in the mode of Implementa-
tion continued. Pressure from the press to expand on the liberation of captured
nations theme resulted in Secretary Dulles stating on 15 February 1953 that the pro-
posed joint declaration by the Congress and by the President (on captive peoples)
had two primary purposes, the second of which was ". . .to register equally drama-
tically the desire and hope of the American people that the captive people shall be
liberated."
The actual draft resolution on captive peoples was similar in sub-
stance but phrased in terms of democratic principles.
The resolution proclaimed:
• . .the hope that the peoples who have been subjected to the
captivity of Soviet despotism shall again enjoy the right of self-
determination within a framework which will sustain the pooce;
that they shall again have the right to choose the form of govern-
ment under which they will live, and that sovereign rights of
64 lbld., p. 208 65Lerch®, op. cit ., p. 294.
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self-government shot! be restored to them all In accordance
with the pledge of the Atlantic Charter. ,_
Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Secretary Dulles
testified in support of the resolution but imparted a more conceptual explanation
from the standpoint of foreign policy. As a matter of fact the statement of 26
February 1953 sounds very much like It could be part of Kennan's original expo-
sition of containment. In part it reads as follows:
So long as there is doubt as to the attitude of the United
States... the captive peoples feel that they have no choice
but to be passive victims allowing themselves to be made tools
of further aggression. If we want to maintain and stimulate
the spirit of freedom which eventually will peacefully frus-
trate the oppressive design of Soviet despotism ana* disintegrate
the over-extended despotism, the first., .step is to make clewit
. . .that. . .the United States seeks, as one of its peaceful
goals, that these enslaved national groups., .shall recover
genuine independence.,.
The emphasis on 'peacefully frustrating" the Soviet was not new. Secretary Dulles
had taken that position as far back as 1950 in his book War or Peace. Preventive
war — or any form of military aggression — was ruled out just as in the containment
thesis. President Elsenhower made this definite In his first inaugural address?
AbhorJng war as a chosen way to balk the purposes of those
who threaten us, we hold it to be the first task of statesmanship
to develop the strength that will deter the forces of aggression
and promote the conditions of peace. .-
On the 16th and 18th of April, President Eisenhower and then Secre-
tary Dulles made Important policy addresses which were significant because they
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occurred six weeks after the death of Statin. But there was no real change in their
substance. While holding the door open to peace, the Eisenhower foreign policy
was remarkably like that which had preceeded it for six years.
If there were any rwsd for further evidence that basic policy was
a continuation of containment and that the public image of liberation was blurred,
it was furnished by two Illustrations.
On the 22nd of June 1953,worker's riots ewptea1 in East Berlin and
East Germany. In the mind of much of the public this was the type of event that
liberation hod envisaged. That the contrary was the object of the administration was
made perfectly plan by Secretary Dulles In a statement to the press a w*ek later.
He remarked:
In my book War or Peace . • . I said: 'The Communist structure
is over extended, over rigid, and ill-founded. It could be shaken
If the difficulties that were latent were activated. ' I went on to
point out that this does not mean an armed revolt which would
precipitate a massacre, but that short of this the people could
demonstrate an independence such that the Soviet Communist
leaders would come to recognize the futility of trying to hold cap-
tive so many peoples.
Again, this Is more in the context of George Kennan's original
treatise on containment than in the public image of liberation. United States re-
sponse to the Polish riots in the summer of 1956, the Polish government crisis that
fall, and the Hungarian revolt which followed so closely, confirmed the United
States ' position.
^Both addresses were before the American Society of Newspaper
Editors. Their texts are contained in Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. 28, pp.
599-603 and pp. 603-60P.
71
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The second evidence of United States commitment to containment
rather than liberation is alto deeply wrapped vp in the paradox that the public image
of the two concepts was a thing apart from their treatment by policy makers. It is
in the concept of massive retaliation.
To the public, at least part of the appeal of liberation lay in the
hypothesis that it would reduce defense costs because United States military power
would be used in its most efficient manner ~ that is, as a deterrent. But deterrence
was a key aim of containment. Thus, at the outset of the new administration plans
were made to place the United States defenses on a long range basis with the whole
of United States policy functioning under the umbrella of nuclear power.
hAany critics of this aspect of United States policy treated the subject
superficially. That is, they purported to see a contradiction In the emphasis on the
positive aspects of liberation while at the same time reducing the military capability
to respond to less than nuclear warfare. Actually, of course, there was no contra-
diction from the standpoint of strategy since the United States did briefly, at least,
possess a vast superiority in nuclear weapons. The only catch was that the nuclear
deterrent had to be credible and willingness to employ it recognized by the Soviet
Union. To this tcsk. Mr. Dulles addressed himself with considerable vigor and skill.
So much so, In fact, that he was accused of "brinksmanship.
"
It will be remembered that there was no rigidity in Mr. Kennan's
original thesis; containment could be effected by counterforce in varying degrees
applied at points other than those affected by Communist pressure. Mr. Dulles simply
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attack on the Soviet Union — a form of "blackmail'' that then superior United
States' strength permitted.
Finally, as a result of a speech in January 1954 It came to be known
as the doctrine of massive retaliation. To the public and indeed to much of the
world, this inferred a nuclear response or none oi all. Actually Mr. Dulles had
said that we ''depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, Instantly, by
means and at places of our choosing. That permits a selection of military means ?n-
72
stead of a multiplication of means."" The doctrine was constantly being explained
ami In the process of explanation, ''graduated response" was fitted Into the original
concept. This could mean conventional forces if appropriate to the situation. For
although the critics talked as though trie United ^tates had only its nuclear power,
the actual fact was that there was a considerable balanced force conventionally
equipped, though Indeed it was purposely deemphaslzed in the effort to Increase the
73
nuclear credibility.
In any event, the validity of massive retaliation rested on two
assumptions: that the United States possessed a virtual nuclear monopoly and thot It
was willing to resort to its use on relatively slight provocation. Probably neither of
these assumptions were correct for more than a brief period, if at all. But if the
72 Ibid., Vol. 30, p. 108.
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This, of course, depended an what kind of action one prepared for.
For an argument that the Administration did not for long seriously consider the
massive retaliation doctrine see Reltzel, op. clt
., pp. 444-445: "While there
has been no official repudiation of the thesis (massive retal lotion), there is little




doctrine was to bo attacked ft had to be on thesa grounds.
Thus, !t can be seen that when the polemic is stripped to Its core
there Is an inner resemblance in the thrust of national strategy as conceived both
before an<i after January 1953. This continuity was reflected In the New Look
military policy which began evolving in the Spring of 1953.

CHAPTER HI
THE NEW LOOK IN MILITARY POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION
It Is, perhaps, easier to undsrstcmd the New Look If ft is kept In
mind that It was created In an effort to correct what were held to be deficiencies
In existing policy. In 1952 and 1953 the outlook of the struggle with Communism
was for an encounter of Indefinite duration. Yet the defense effort then required
imposed tax burdens, economic dislocations, and a domestic status quo that were
more In keeping with a struggle that hod a foreseeable terminal point. Also, the
character of the LJnlted States defense forces did not seem to take account of Its
(nanpyfi/er deficiency vis-a-vis the covfet Union. As Walter Lippmcnn had pointed
out In 1947, responding to pressure In kind was not practicable because It required
a large standing army for an indefinite period.
Samuel Huntington has noted that by the and of 1952, a gap hod
opened between the Truman Administration's military and domestic goats — a gap
that was brought about by Its success In plugging a previously existing (1946-V
gap between military policy and foreign pollc y (In other words the gap between
2
aspiration or pretense on the one hand and capability on the other). But, con-
tinued Professor Huntington, "It was obviously too late. . .for the Truman Admlnis-
Wolter Llppmann, The Cold War (New York: Harper and Bros.,
Inc., 1947), pp. 19ff.
2
Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York:






trotion to formulate a new relationship." Thus, he adds, "Th<s great problem of
the Eisenhower Administration was to devise a new strategy adequate to foreign
policy needs and feasible in terms of domestic realities."
Far from being a reprehensible pursuit of narrow self-interest, from
seeking 'more bang for a buck, " as charged by some, the efforts to evolve a new
5
military policy were instead a response to the dictates of objective reality. And,
tn retrospect, It is interesting to observe that the elements of an argument were pre-
sent whatever the choice — for an emphasis of air retaliatory power or on a balanced
force posture, for domestic austerity or for military plenty, or for some balance of
the two.
It Is, therefore, in the light of objective factors that one can most
clearly differentiate the overlapping areas of policy and strategy. Consider the
following:
First, the threat of Communism was real; it has an avowed universe-
listSe aim which together with its unconventional political conduct was perceived as
a threat to the vital interests of the United States. Yet It could hardly be extirpated
at its source (as Edmund Burke had advocated with respect to the Jaeobtnlst regime
In France). Also, militarily the United States was weak. Thus, the need to
3 ibid. 4lbid.
For example, C. L. Sulzberger, What's Wrong With U. ~. Foreign
Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 195$), op m 106-W7 , relates the
"Radford-Dulles theory of massive retaliation" to "the concept of a bigger bang for
a buck."
*^ee, for example, William Peitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and
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rebuild a strong military establishment and to contain the danger was almost In the
nature of a reflex action.
Second, static containment was insufficient to satisfy those to whom
the gap between aspiration and capability was not apparent. This gap had to be
demonstrated more convincingly and thus the dialogue about 'liberation" was talked
out to the point where its futility was recognizable, at which point the concept was
relegated gently to the status of a distant goal
.
Third, in the process of adjusting its military strength to Its respon-
sibilities as a world power, the United States had developed an imbalance between
m
its domestic program and its military program. If this was acceptable in the short
run it was clear! > politically inexpedient as a long-term policy. Thus, there arose
the determination to find a better balance by taking a now look ' at the immediate
source of the imbalance — United Stotes military policy.
Finally, as a means of restoring the balance between economic factors
and military demands, it was deliberately decided that a new imbalance would be
created within the militory establishment by shifting from a 'balanced force* concept
9
to an air retaliatory power concept. This new imbalance was to be compensated
Constance G. Coblenz, United Stotes Foreign Policy 1945-1955 (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1956), pp. 4% - 50 and p. 92.
Such evidence can be found in a number of sources. Indicative Is
jofen W. Spanler, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (Rev, ed., New Yorkj





Initially the Administration favored the balanced forces concept but
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for by a determination, a will to employ nuclear power to restrain aggressions that
otherwise would have required large conventional forces, logically enough this
led to the doctrine of "massive retaliation, v which was announced by Secretary of
10
State Dulles on January 12, 1954.
Nor was this the end. As It became apparent that nuclear response
and large scale retaliation by other means — such as conventional air or naval
power — was credible only In selected areas and against extreme provocation and
as the ^ovlet Union began to acquire — It was assumed — a nuclear striking capa-
bility of Its own, It became necessary to reassert the importance of the balanced
force ~ at least for small scale conflicts.
Yet, as reasonable as the balanced force concept appeared In logic,
It was dearly Illusory if its aim was to provide anything approaching "total" security,
Particularly Is this the case if one country — the United States — felt It necessary
to do all the responding. The appearance of large-scale guerrilla warfare In South-
east Asis was a surprise gap that indicated a new imbalance — a political-military
gap, if you will — fostered by preoccupation with the previous imbalance. Of
course, this gap Is now being plugged. But certain Is the knowledge that as United
would not permit balancing of the economic-military aquation. The Chairman of the
JCS presented his strategic recommendations for an enlarged air retaliatory capacity
In December 1953. See the New York Times, 11 November 1953, p. 17 and 15
December 1953, p. 1.
In a speech before the Council on Foreign Relations In New York,
12 January 1954. For text see Department of State, Bulletin, Vol. 30, pp, 107-
110; also the New York Times, 13 January 1954, p. 3.
1 1 Mr, Dulles had, of course, never departed from the obvious n&94










States military forces take on the appearance of a true balanced force, other factors
In the so-called strategic equation will be drawn on and new imbalances will appear,
There will be new gaps and the plugging process will continue * Such 1$ the nature
of the relationship.
As Huntington has shrewdly observed: "The reclfzation of any one
12
goof normally limits realization of the others."
II. GENBI^OFTHENEWLOOK
in Washington in Apr!! of 1953 Senator Robert A. Taft
. . .called for a 'new look" at the entire military program of
the Truman Administration as a prelude to cutting Government
spending ®nd taxes in 1954-55. The "snate Republican said any
"complete restudy" should not be wade by the present Joint Chiefs
of Staff because no man was "the right man to review his own pro-
gram to which he had committed his judgment."
13
The term "new look" was fastened on by newsmen and cam® to be identified with the
Eisenhower Administration's restudy of defense needs. In Jum, Secretary of Defense
Wilson was quoted as saying that the Administration was taking "a new look at the
entire defense picture. And on January 12, 1954, Secretary of ^tate Dulles
retaliation" speech will verify. He explained this other side of the policy at some






News Item in the New York Times, 7 April 1953, p. 21.
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Approorlotions,
Hearings on the Department of Defense Appropriations for FY 1954, ?3rd Congress,
1st Session (Washington: GovernmenT Print!ngT)??!c©, 1^55^7 p. 6; source cited In
Charles O. Lerche, Foreign Policy of the American People (2nd ed., Englewood














delivered a major speech to the Council on Foreign Relations entitled "The New
Look." From on unofficial statement, the phrase had passed Into the status of
official appellation,
The policy which bore this title encompassed four distinct phases of
development. In the first phase, the objective factors that produced the military-
economic policy imbalance asserted themselves and recognition of this situation
brought forth a response In the form of criticism and alternative proposals.
The second phase began with the inauguration of the Eisenhower
Administration; the policy was formulated during this period.
Then followed a period of policy Integration and modification during
which time the assumptions and aims of the policy were tested in the press of circum-
stance.
Finally, policy disintegration set in as a change In objective factors
reduced the validity of the original assumptions.
Crystallization of Reaction to Containment
Although reaction to containment covered a spectrum of views and
dated back to 1947, when the strategy was first expounded, it is only necessary to
consider the thoughts of one man to discover the rationale which was later to be
asserted as official policy. This man was John Foster Dulles.
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Halt, Inc., 1961), p. 350 n. 5.
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In his book, WarorP#ace, published in 1950, Mr. Dulles set
16
forth his views as to what course United States' foreign policy should pursue.
The idem expressed were, of course, those of a private citizen; but they become
the core of the intellectual reaction to static containment. It was a mature work
that in addition to examining and critiquing contemporary policies and trends pro-
pounded the rationale for American participation In a world community thot needed
peace because, in his words, the stakes were "the greatest for which men have ever
j J 7played.
He advocated a dedicated and sustained effort for peace. "This
quest, he wrote, "can be an enthralling adventure to those who recognize the
IP
danger, see the goals, and follow the moves and countermoves." It was necessary
to know the enemy — the covlet Communist Party — and to be aware that although
this enemy is immune to persuasion he is tactically responsive to power:
Power is the key to success in dealing with the Soviet leader-
ship. Power, of course, includes not merely military power, but
economic power and the intangibles, such as moral judgment and
world opinion, which determine what men do and the intensity
with which they do it.
j
Note Mr. Dulles' explicit mention of the economic dimension of
power.
But simple opposition to or even disposition of the Soviet Union was
not his idea of peace. Peace was not "isolation, or. . .world domination by the
,0John Foster Dulles, War or Peace ( New York: The Macmillan
Co., 1950), passim.
1
Jbld., p. 4 l8 lbid.,
19|b!d., p. 16.
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United States, or. . .stagnation. "''' Instead, it was "a condition of community,
21
of diversity, and of change. Obviously, to Mr. Dulles, the Soviet evil had
to be countered if peace were to become possible and, in this regard, "a strong
military establishment (did) not check the us© of fraud, terrorism, and violence
22
as methods of indirect aggression.' Something mors was nmtded. "A policy
which, at best, merely countered) direct aggression (was) bound to be inadequate.
On the surface, there would appear to be little in Mr. Dulles' ideas
that was not equally accepted by the people whose policies he sought to influence
or change. But there was a difference and It could be felt by the man In the street.
The thrust of Mr. Duties' argument was that the world was not simply a
collection of depersonalized nation-states which merely mad« sdf-interested moves
and counter-moves to maintain or to improve on the status quo; this was not the "good
life."
Rather, the states of the world formed a true community that had its
laws and ethics and morals. There were "good" states and "bod'' states according to
their sense of community attachment, ~tates had definite responsibilities and failure
to discharge them was evidence of immoral conduct. Communism was an evil be-
cause it struck at the ralson d'etre of the international system — that Is, it sought
to destroy the community rather than to effect peaceful change within it. Moreovar,
























neither conterminous with political frontiers nor, externally, inter-government;
facing Communism required a good measure cf moral rearmament.
In sum, to Mr, Dulles, peace meant far more than the absence of warj
it meant a pattern of life as well* And to secure this pattern it was America's un-
avoidable responsibility to use its power, its prestige, and its position as the leader
of th» free world.
Mr. Dulles' views were far mors than those of fust another armchair
specialist. He was generally understood to have been Dewey's choice for c 3cretary
of "tare If he had been elected In either 1944 or 1949. During the past-World
War II era of foreign policy bi-partisanship he had served as a foreign affairs advisor
to the State Department. And between September 1950 and September 1951 he con-
25
ducted the negotiations which culminated in the Japanese Peace Treaty. T'-r
last considerably enhanced his stature as a statesman and identified him in the minds
of many as a person somewhat removed from the more narrow partisan political scene*
During the period prior to his becoming Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles was
to reveal even more of the thoughts that proved to be the foundation for the New
look and the correlative doctrine of massive retaliation. Having severed his connec-
tion with the r>tate Department several months after the signing of the Japanese
Peace Treaty he directed his thoughts to the coming political campaign and, according
**John Robinson Beat, John Foster Dulles 1388-1959 . (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1957, 1959), p. 1W.
*
25jbid., Chapter 10, "Bipartisanship 4 and Chapter 12, "Pilot Operations
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and personality of... General Dwight D. Eisenhower."
It was in a speech on this trip that Dulles made statements which, when
repeated twenty months later, were to have a profound impact on world opinion.
The following is excerpted from a news account of that speech:
Contending that the French had been left "too much alone" In
Indo-Chlna, John Foster Dulles. . .suggested today that the best
defense of that area and other parts of Asia would be a threat of
retaliatory action against Communist China or the Soviet Union.
"Is it not time that the Chinese Communists knew that If, for
example, they sent their Red armies openly into Vietnam we will
not be content merely to try to me^t their armed forces at the point
they select for their aggression but by retaliatory action of our own
fashioning' " asked Mr. Dulles. . .
.
This same theme was expanded and developed a week later In an address
to the National Conference of Christians and J?ws. In addressing that group, Mr.
Dulles declared according to a news account, that " *lt must be assumed' that the
28
Kremlin will continue to apply pressure 'for another generation or even more.'"'
Three points for a program or policy were listed:
1
.
We must Invent ways to defend the entire frontiers of freedom. . .
.
2. But we cannot create 20,990 miles of static defame In depth,
able to hold back the Red armies at every particular point which ||
might choose to attack.
3. Therefor®, the only deterrent that will, at bearable cost
(emphasis supplied), protect the entire frontier ot" Freedom Is the
organization of power to hit any aggressor — where It hurts — If he
26ibid., p. 129
57
In Paris 5 May 1952 to the French National Political "cionce Institute.
News Item in the New Yor Times, 6 May 1952, p. 3.
2eNew Item In the New York Times, 13 Moy 1952, p. .
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should commit himself to open armed aggression anywhere.
Thus, it can be seen that some months prior to taking office, the
essential ei entente of the New Look had taken shop® in the mind of one of the
principal architects of the new administration's grand strategy. To wlte the long
term approach; the balance between military needs and economic capacities; the
resolute notice that afl of the free world was off-limits for aggression; and the
willingness to use power in retaliation af places and by means chosen by the United
States. As for the "massive" aspect of retaliation, it was assuredly Implicit but
would await another twenty rnonths before being given Its extraordinary emphasis.
Only the specific mix of nuclear air power and conventional arms was left unsaid
and this, as it turned out, was an ad{ustment dictated by the logic of specific ob~
fective factors.
Ill FORMULATION OF THE NEW LOCK
The campaign commitment to find a new way to pursue American goals
was formally restated in both the Inaugural Address and the first State of the Union
Message, in the former, President Eisenhower declared:
Abhorring war as a chosen way to balk the purposes of those who
threaten us, we hold it to be the first task of statesmanship to develop
the strength that wHI deter the forces of aggression and promote the
conditions of peace. 3$
In another paragraph, he focused on the particular condition that would restrain
|>jd., direct quotation appears in news item.
30






any unlfrr)it©d preoccupation with the military aspect of strength:
Recognizing economic health as an Indhp^nsable basis of
military strength and the free world's peace, we shall strive to
foster everywhere, and to practice ourselves, policies that en-
courage productivity and profitable trade. 3
j
That this linking of the economy and the character of the military effort
was mors than a collateral concern was made undeniably explicit in the President's
State of the Union Message. On February 2, 1953, he said to Congress:
Our problem is to achieve adequate military strength within
the limits of endurable strain upon our 2conom> . To amass military
power without regard to our economic capacity would be to defend
ourselves against one kind of disaster by inviting another.
Both military and economic objectives demand a single notional
milltar) policy (emphasis supplied}. . .
.32
Primary responsibility was assigned Defense Secretary Wilson u for devel-
oping plans to give... max\mum safety at minimum cost."'
Such a responsibility obviously required a survey and study of considerable
depth. Thus, it is rather natural that apprehensions as to what was afoot should arise
In the meantime.
Democrats In Congress were particularly outspoken In their demands to be
kept informed as to the state of the nation's defenses and their pressure in the Senate
Armed Services Committee led the chairman of the group, Senator ^altonstali, to
request such information from the President. Hie President replied that a "careful
and accurate analysis" was being conducted to determine the "adequacy and orfen-
31
Ibid.
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34
ration' of the defense program.
€ven Congressional Republicans began to spook
oof on their own and Senator Toft's "New Look" statement was made a few days
later.
35
From a foreign policy standpoint, Secretary Dulles let it be known,
about this time, that th© United States' new defense policies were being "predicated
36
on t«m or twenty years of tension* — a predictable assumption even though '"ratio
had been dead for a month and there was at least hope that East-West relations could
be Improved.
As the study proceeded it became evident that there existed, In Pro-
fessor Huntington's words, a "conflict between the new administration's goals and
the military strategy and programs Inherited from the Truman Administration."
Reduction of expenditures in order to secure a balanced budget in FY 1955, if not
in FY 1954, was a ma]or Eisenhower Administration objective ond the greatest bur-
11
6®n for its realization fell on the Defense Department.
""
decretory Wilson made it his aim to reduce the Truman military sxpen-
dltures program for FY 1954 by 10 percent, from $45.5 billion to $41 billion.
This action he had to sell to the National security Council and President Elsenhower.
3-A
News item in the New York Times, 2 April 1953, p. 1.
35
5ee footnote 13, above.
36
Through a ''high source' in the State Department. :ee news Item In
100 New York Times, £ April 1953, p. 1.
3
Huntington, op. cit.
, p. 0. -Jd.


















To make this feasible it was, according to a press report, Secretary Wilson's plan
"to shift the emphasis from building a broad mobilization base to a greater concen-
40
tration on currently needed weapons." This was In line with th« thinking in
the "ever-prepared" defense plan made public on 30 April 1953 by President
Eisenhower.
However, the Joint Chiefs of ftaff were set against a military policy
that involved such large scale cuts in funds. They informed the National "eeurlty
Council not only that the projected cuts would "seriously endanger national security,"
but also that any cuts at oil would do the same* enator Toft's comment that no
man was "the right mon to review his own program to which he has committed his
43judg ment" appeared to be an apt summation of the situation. Professor Hunting-
ton writes that ''an impasse existed between the new Administration, committed to
economy and a stable program, and the old Joint Chiefs, committed to a substantial
44
military build-up.. . .'
In May 1 953, nearly three months prior to the retirement of the "old"
Joint Chiefs of "taff c new set of officers was appointed to the JCI and in the interim
45
was directed to begin a study of military policy and strategy. ' The budget pro-
blem then devolved by a process of elimination to the civilian officials of the
^tbld. But this objective was modified, considerably, lets than a
month later. 5ee New York Times, 12 May 1953, p. 1.
4,]bld., 1 May 1953, p. 1. ^Huntington, op.cit ., p. I,
43New York Times , 7 April 1953, p.21 . ^Huntington, OD.cit., p. 71
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Administration and it was accomplished with little In the way of a strategic
46
guide.
President Eisenhower had, of course, made known his goals but the
weighing of capabilities and limitations bearing on them had not been completed.
However, progress was being mado In the general area of strategy . The Truman
estimate had seen a crisis arising In 1954-1955 as the United States lost its atomic
monopoly and as nuclear weapons became available to both sides. This was dis-
carded by President Elsenhower in favor of the assumption that the relative strength
of the "soviet Union vis-a-vis ths United States would not greatly alter until the
A
late 1950*8. A sustained, balanced strength was to be maintained, although with
4-
full recognition that no military force could ensure absolute security.
These aims were ail public knowledge and It was not long before some
protests were heard that economic stability was being sought at the expense of national
security. Obviously It was true, In large measure, that economic stability was being
pursued by reducing military expenditures. The difference revolved about whether
reducing projected military expenditures correspondingly reduced the degree of
national security. It was af this time — May 1953 — that the charge was first made
^kmtington, op. ctt
., pp. 71 f.
ft might be noted that despite all of the technological progress of
the US5I during the interval 1953~]?60, the real relative strength of the two statas
did not greatly change. This was true despite the foot that nuclear parity was
"accepted" as a fact by many informed writers and officials some of whom even
postulated a succession of weapons 'gaps" \n favor of the ^oviet Union.








that defense policy was made In the Budget Bureau.
However, the Administration held Its course and continued to relt srate
at the same time Its twin objectives of balancing the budget and maintaining a long-
haul, deterrent military posture. Secretary Wilson specifically denied that the
budget cuts would imperii the national security and, paradoxically, he later had
fo deny that he planned to match the Soviet Union on a man-to-man basis."'
The Chairman of the outgoing Joint Chiefs of Stuff, General Bradley,
took the opposite argument — that is, that abandoning the "crisis-years" approach
and reducing the military budget were both dangerous. * And behind the scenes
was an unknown quantity opposing the Administration's reductions: the Air Force
which had been hardest hit by the administratively-administered budget trimming.
The Secretary of ^tate continued to contribute his support to a program
of maximum national strength geared to a "long-haul, '' making numerous references
54
to this tHi&6 in his speeches and press conferences.
Inevitably, however, It remained for the President to sell his own pro-
49lbld., 27 May 1953, p. 9.
50
Ibid. , 29 May 1953, p. 1. (President Eisenhower)
51
Ibid. , 12 May 1953, p. 1, and 12 June 1953, p. 1.
52|bld., July 1953, p. 19.
53
Huntington, op. cit
., p. 1 . Ths Air Force's new appropriations
were cut from $16. 8 billion to $11. 7 billion; their 143 wing target was reduced to 1 14.
Newspapers—for example, the New York Times—carried, in the first half of June,
almost daily stories on the argument for or against the cut in the number of Air Force
wings.
^ee news items In the New York Times 17 May 1953, p. 31; 30 May













gram. He w<h the responsible official, the decision-maker, and It was to htm that
the public looked to discover what was vital in the program. A statement to a
press conference in late April summed up clearly what was to be the underlying
logic of the New Look during Its Ufa span.
I have always firmly believed that there is a great logic in the
conduct of military affairs. There is an squally great logic In
economic affairs. If these two logical disciplines can be wedded,
it is then possible to create a situation of maximum military strength
within economic capacities.
The program we are presenting is a long-term program callings
for a steady and adequate flow of men otvi materials to present a
position of genuine strength to any would-be aggressor.
The basic elements of our strategic problem have not materially
changed In recent years, and certainly not in recent days. . .
.
What we are doing is to adopt a new policy for the solution of the
problem.
This change in policy is radical and cannot be changed overnight
a e • •
The essence of the change is this. We reject the Idea that we
must build up to a maximum attainable strength for some specific
date theoretically fixed. . . . Defense is a matter of adequate pro-
tection to be projected as far Into the future as the actions and
apparent purposes of others may compel us.
It is a policy thct can If necessary be lived with over a period
of years. «c
The most Immediately obvious step for bringing this concept into reality
had been that of reducing expenditures so that as the goal of a balanced budget was
approached taxes could be lowered. B%tt how to solvn the military side of the
equation was the problem. As the summer came and passed, it became more and
more apparent that the high degree of military strength, which was an objective of
an equal order as that of economic stability, was not so easily compatible with the
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depth of budget cuts neodexi to achieve a fiscal balance.
The new Joint Chiefs of ~taff, who, on their selection In May, hod
been directed to moke recommendations consistent with balancing the military-
economic equation, had sxpsrienced difficulty in their task and were prodded
publicly by Secretary Wilson. Five days later, on 24 September, it was reported
that the new Chisfs had conducted "a thorough review of the United Statss* military
position and their ilttllUlH of the situation. . .were not much different from the
57
estimates of their predecessors.' This, of course, could be said to have been
not unexpected Inasmuch a$ President ?is$nhower Hod himself declared fust prior to
ihelr selection that "the basic elements" of the strategic problem had not changed.
What apparently was lacking was a key to solution of the problem.
That this was the case was borne out by the dismal reception accorded these reconv-
mentbtions when presented to the National Security Council In October. Observers
characterized them as not being radical and as a return to the "balanced forces"
principle of dividing the budget In roughly aqucl portions. The NSC mhirm6 the
recommendations to the Pentagon for extensive revision In order to better support
the Administration's economic and fiscal plans.
Meanwhile, developments In the field of strategy were taking place
which were later to have deep budgetary implications. The some NSC paper
56lbtd. , 20 September 1953, p. .
57
Ibid. , 25 September 1953, p. 1.
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(NSC 162) which had recommended a continuation of containment had also advised
"greater reliance on nuclear airpower In implementing that policy'' and "a substan-
ce
tlal expansion of continental defense.*1
The new Joint Chiefs had also recommended greater emphasis on stra-
tegic retaliatory power and on continental air defense but, in his presentation of the
JCS paper on 13 October to the NSC, Admiral Radford had not incorporated the full
implications of this special emphasis. He had, however, according to Professor
Huntington, "implicitly suggested. • .abandonment of the assumption that general
60
war or large-scale limited war would be waged without recourse to nuclear weapons."
This also, it can be observed, was implicit in Secretary Wilson's only partially suc-
cessful plan to do away with the concept of developing a broad mobilisation base
for future wartime use; an attitude restated in another comment to the effect that SAC
was a major deterrent to war.~
Following presentation of the JCS paper and discussion of NSC 162,
both in the context of the budget for FY 1955, a new paper, NSC 162/2, was pre-
pared in which a deterrent strategy was adopted. President Elsenhower approved
this paper at the end of October and it was then simply a matter of the JCS drawing
















Again, ft was the "ecretary of Defense who Hpped the press as to the
course of defense planning when, on 10 November, he hinted that the "balanced
forces" concept might be replaced by a budget reflecting an emphasis on air
63
retaliatory power. ' A month later, in a speech before the National Press Club
In Washington, Admiral Radford made it at l^ast semi -official. "A New Look,"
he said,
Is a reassessment of our strategic m^ logistic capabilities in the
light of forseeable developments, certain technical advances,
the world situation today, and considerable estimating of future
trench and developments. It is a searching review of this nation's
military requirements for security.^
Me then discussed the areas to b® emphasized: M air supremacy, In-
65
creased reliance on atomic weapons, and fewer m&n under arms.
"
The Pentagon's New Look was a three-year plan to recast defense
posture. Goals were to be gradually implemented during the period that was to
end 30 June 1957. Manpower was to be reduced to 2,815,000 while the Air Force
was to build up to 127 wings. The intention was that the 195" posture would then
66
be maintained Indefinitely. "Army and Navy personnel and funds.. .were to be
substantially trimmed In line with an increasing shift of emphasis to concepts keyed
67
to atomic attack gsuH defense." The plan was approved by the NSC and the
President several days after Admiral Radford's address.
*&New York Times , 1 1 November 1953, p. 1 .





67The New York Times, 30 December 1953, p. 1.








IV. INITIAL RECEPTION OF THE NEW LOOK
Unlike Hie public image of military policy, the New Look had o heavy
politico! component from Hie start. The Democrats had been simultaneously criti-
cized for not having contained the expansion of Communism and then for excessive
military expenditure and its accompanying taxation. At the same time the thrust
of the Republican platform was towards a military establishment second to none —
maximum security but at the minimum bearable cost. The critics purported to see a
contradiction in the Republican aims and, apparently, deliberately misconstrued the
platform goal of liberation to imply a commitment for active measures to effect phy-
68
sical liberation. For years this product of political expediency was to be held
up, with some justice, as an example of hypocrisy.
However, all this was outside the scope of the question of military policy .
The immediate concern was the state of the nation's defenses. If, as the Republicans
hod charged, they were in such need of revamping, what was being done to accomplish
69
this? This led to the exchange of letters between Senator Saltomtali and President
Eisenhower referred to above . But it was the civilian-administered trimming to the
FY 1954 budget that brought forth the first sustained criticism.
Obviously the critics were in no position to assay accurately the effects
of these cuts but it was equally obvious that since they were effected over the objec-
tions of the JCS that the Administration would also find them difficult to defend on
68
See Spanier, op. cit., pp. 100-109
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See, for example, news items in the New fork Times, 15 February
1953, p. 1; 17 February 1953, p. 18; and 19 February 1953, p. 24 in which















the basis of a responsible study.
A»so, since one of the services, the Air Force, had had its new appro-
priations cut nearly a third and its goal of 143 wings reduced to 114, a great deal
of self-interested information could be found flowing from that source. Until late
in the fall the debate on "balanced forces" (meaning a three-way budget spiir)
71
versus strategic retaliatory power was a matter the public had to live with . How-
ever, the whole matter quickly subsided with the unanimous recommendation of the





The New Look decisions settled one issue, the airpower issue, at least
ntarily, but gave the Democrats an issue which they were to raise until the end
of President Eisenhower's second term: that national security had been subordinated
73
to an archaic fiscal concept.
In fact, it can be argued that in constructing a policy that is mainly
concerned with plugging one gap or correcting one imbalance, time wiil surely open
a new gap or unbalance another component. But with respect to the New Look,
nFootnote 40, above.
71
Several illuminating articles by Hanson W. Boidwin appeared in the
4ew York Times in the Spring end Fail of 1953 on the issues of military policy: 14
May, p. 17; 17 May, sec. VI, p. 7; 13 June, p. 7; 8 November, see IV, p. 4.
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Huntington, op. eit ., Chapter VI, "The Competition of Strategic
Programs" is on extraordinarily penetrating account of post World War II inter-service
competition and the underlying rationale.
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The JCS New Look proposals were approved by President Eisenhower
on 19 December 1953; by 30 December Democratic leaders in both Houses were chal-
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Professor Huntington puts ail such criticism in perspective:
The new strategy was part of a coherent set of economic,
fiscal/ and miiitary policies. While differences, of course,
existed among mmmber% of the Administration, unusual agree-
ment oiso existed on the Administration's priorities; reduce
expenditures, balance the budget, reduce taxes, in that order,
white maintaining a military posture sufficient to preserve
national security against the Soviet threat for art indefinite
period of time . The New Look strategy . . .was designed to
accomplish these goals. It was the appropriate military com-
ponent of the Administration's overall policy. The New Look
was one case where a-. Administration hoc its goa»s clearly fn
tv.ii-.Q and" 'pursued them with vigor and Jeter til ..au^i. The'
"
substQjr.ee of its 'policy can be criticized; the absence of o






THE NEW LOCK IN ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The Government-public dialogue, which occurred during the New
look's formulation period, superficially had ali the characteristics of a classic of
Its kind. In retrospect, it can be seen that none of the key assumptions or objec-
tives that later were adopted as Administration policy were absent from the great
debate. " Of course, as could be expected in such a dialogue — then as now —
discussion of the issues had been piecemeal in the sense that while the general
overall framework of the Administration's proposed policy was visible, the interest
groups of the government and public tended to focus on the particular aspect that
suited their purposes.
Thus air power proponents concentrated criticism on the Initial Admin-
istration objective of maintaining a 'balanced force"; Democrats likened the idea
of reducing the budget to reducing national security; industry was concerned with
maintaining a broad mobilization base; other groups attacked the implicit plans to
reduce the size and future dependency on large reserve organizations; both the
Army and the Administration backed the concept of a strong, mobile centrally-
located strategic reserve of combat-ready troops; and an expanded continental
defense was to air power backers, a further dilution of the effort to attain a strong
air-retaliatory force.
The dialogue took place over a prolonged period and therefore afforded
fV: >VCr*
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the non-inturested public the opportunity to become acquainted with and used to the
main features of the policy proposals and alternatives. Thus, it might have been not
unreasonable to have expected a synthesis of sorts to hove emerged from the lengthy
dialectic. Yet within a month following the President's final policy decision on
the New Look it became painfully obvious that the dialectical process ~ if that is
o good description — was an Incomplete one. The whole rationale of the Nation's
military policy was called Into question in the great debate on '"massive" or 'instant"
retaliation.
Why, it may be asked, was there such a violent reaction to a policy
about which so much was already known and whose general features were rather pre-
dictable?
Apparently the main reason lay in ths assumptions serving as foundations
for the policies and programs that were to constitute the policy as a whole. There
were four of these which have been described as 'crucial . ' They were:
1) that no significant increase would take place In the existing
level of international tension;
2) that no significant changes would occur in the existing ratio
of Soviet to American power;
3) that American massive retaliatory capacity was the major
deterrent to both general and limited war; and
4) that nuclear weapons would be used in general war and in
any limited war to the extent required by military exigencies.
This last assumption was given Presidential approval in late October 1953
but even before then it was implicit in the logic of a strong nuclear air-retaliatory
Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense, (New York: Columbia
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deterrent. That is, If a deterrent was to be credible the possessor had to In fact be
willing to resort to it In circumstances In which those weapons of the deterrent were
the difference between success or failure of a national policy. It was not sufficient
simply to have the nuclear capacity or to threaten to use it; actual willingness to
make use of that capacity must also be present. For an absence of intent is not
likely to remain long undiscovered.
But because this assumption — that nuclear weapons would be used if
necessary to compensate for enemy superiority in land power — because this assum-
ption was implicit rather than explicit, the general public never had to face the fact
that the United States might be required to display a nuclear Initiative In response
3
to an ambiguous form of Communist aggression.
It was equally true that as long as this threat was implicit, the Soviet
Union might fall to recognize it as a threat. Thus, one of ifie other crucial'
assumptions — that nuclear air retaliatory power was the major deterrent to both
limited and general war •* would be weakened.
Therefore, the logic of the New Look led to Hie necessity of making
clear not only United States determination to oppose Communist aggressive expansion
but also to spell out the manner in which counter-action might be token. This is
what Secretory Dulles undertook in his address to the Council on Foreign Relations.
II. MASSIVE RETALIATION AND THS GREAT DBATE
The great debate which Secretary Dulles touched off was <kt€t to the fact
3An additional factor undoubtedly playing a role in public thinking
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that he took careful aim at the Kremlin's walls and fired a blast that hit the
American public squarely in the eye. 'in diplomatic relations, ' writes John
Gang*, 'nations rarely speak bluntly about a possible use of force. Generally
use is made of some phrase such as 'necessary measures to preserve our interests'
4
. . .for the term military force is not a favored one.
'
Gange then goes on to shift blame for this sort of verbal subterfuge'
to the public because, he observes, it prefers hearing that 'measures will be taken*
5
rather than that 'force will be used*. . . . ' He concludes by saying that 'It Is not
surprising. . .that the American public and other national publics were startled and
shocked when. . .Dulles stated baldly the firm intention. . .to use 'massive retalia-
tory power.'
The greater part of his address Secretory Dulles devoted to a restatement
of the New Look policy and its rationale, in this he was repeating familiar words
and concepts. As a matter of fact, President Eisenhower In his second State of the
Union Message had, only five days before, said similar things — that the United
States aim was to deter aggression, that to accomplish this, new weapons and air
power were to be given a high priority, that manpower reductions would be possible
because of this new emphasis, and that a strong, mobile centrally-located strategic
7
reserve would reduce the necessity for overseas deployments.
\John Gange, American Foreign Relations (New York* Ronald Press
Co., 1959), p. 316.
5lbid.
, p. 317 6lbid.
7








The Secretory of State, in a similar vein, started his speech with
recognition of the need for allies and collective security. These relations (with
allies) he said could be made more effective "by placing more reliance on deterrent
power, and lets dependence on local defensive power. . . . We want, for ourselves
and the other free nations, a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost. ' Then he
went on to develop the relationship of the deterrent to local defense:
local defense will always be important. But there is no local
defense which alone will contain the mighty land power of the
Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further
deterrent of massive retaliatory power. A potential aggressor must
know that he cannot always prescribe battle conditions that suit
him.Q
Willingness to employ force — an ingredient implicit In the art of
statecraft — was made explicit: 'The way to deter aggression is for the free com-
munity to be willing and able to respond vigorously af places and with means of its
own choosing.
"
Now from on analytical viewpoint everything had been said and said
in the normal language of diplomats in democratic countries: the development of
the deterrent to replace manpower and local defensive forces; the characterization
of the deterrent as "massive retaliatory power' ; the willingness to employ this power
if deterrence should fail; the idea that the point of response would be at the option
of the free world; and, of course, the very clear implication that a massive response
would probably entail the use of nuclear weapons. The one new element introduced
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was the decreased significance to be attached In the future to Ioca! defensive
forces and this was, for the most part, of importance because of Its diplomatic
consequences.
Perhaps if nothing more had been said, reaction would have been
slight — after all, be had referred to the free community' 4 as being the 'unit of
response. ' But the Secretory went on to reveal a logic of immense force that under-
lay the entire New Look policy*
So long as our basic policy concepts were unclear, our
military leaders could not be selective In building our military
power. If an enemy could pick his time and place and method
of warfare. . .then we needed to be ready to fight in the arctic
and In the tropics; in Asia, the Near East and in Europe; by
sea, by land and by air; with old weapons and with new weapons.
The cost of such a program, he declared, was having an adverse effect
on the dollar. It . . .could not be continued for long without grave budgetary,
12
economic and social consequences. 1 ' Thus, another implication was implanted
in Hie statement of the alternative to deterrence and massive retaliation as being
unsatisfactory to the economic security of the nation — the implication that ^na
alternative could not be entertained.
But #ie paragraph which lifted the stark assumptions of the New Look
into the consciousness of most of the world was stlti to follow. It was simple, con-
cise, and, on its face, explicit)
Before military planning could be changed, the President
and his advisors. . .had to take some basic policy decisions. This
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a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at
places of our choosing. Now the Department of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our military estab-
lishment to fit what is our policy, instead of having to try
to be ready to meet the enemy's many choices. That per-
mits of a selection of military means. As a result, it is now
possible to get, and share, more basic security at less cost
••••13
Gone was the ambiguity and vagueness of previous statements. A do*
cision had been made. The security of the nation was to rely on s a great capacity
to retaliate* and to do so 'Instantly. ; Where only several paragraphs before ihe
Secretary had alluded to the response of the 'free community' In phrases that
suggested deliberate and consultative action by free world statemen, It now appeared
that a basic decision had been made for unilateral nuclear response by the United
States in something of an automatic fashion.
Cf course, no such construction can be entertained If Hie address is
viewed as a whole or if viewed in the context of what other Administration spokes-
men, including President Eisenhower and Admiral Radford, had said.
Massive retaliation, yes. But the American Secretary of State was hardly
of the temperament that would advocate abdication of responsible and sober consi-
deration of the circumstances of a situation In favor of an automatic contingency
plan.
Public reaction to the speech was immediate and covered a brood
'3The New York Times, 13 January 1954, p. 3.
The address of Admiral Radford to the National Press Club on 14
December 1953, text ibid. , 15 December 1953, p. 31 and President Eisenhower's







nspectrum of views. Air power proponents backed a strong Air Force and the de-
terrent-retaliation emphasis while playing down the importance of the roles of the
15
other two services. ' Administration proponents in Congress backed the President
and Secretary Dulles while pointing out the New Look's other features.
The President himself tried to put the matter in perspective on the
very next day following the Secretary's address by stating it as his belief that
deterrence had already operated to deter the Soviet Union from attacking the United
States for some years; at the same time he emphasized the flexibility and balance in
16
the plan despite the monetary imbalance that favored the Air Force.
At the same time, some Democrats were concerned that the retaliatory
17
potential was actually suffering as a result of the Administration's budget cutting.
Another twist, which the Secretary of Defense took time out to confront,
was the specious charge that if Russia should accept atomic disarmament the United
IS
States would be endangered. Some Democratic Senators — Albert Gore, Henry
19
Jackson, and A. S. Monroney — were against the Idea of massive retaliation.
Senator Stuart H . Symington thought the Administration was underrating
Soviet air power. And Senator .Michael Mansfield volunteered the observation
^or example, Mafor Alexander P. de Sevenky, ibid ., 4 January 1954,
p. 8 and 3 February 1954, p. 3; ex-Air Force Secretary Finletter and ex-Air Force
Under-Secretary Gllpatric, Ibid, 26 January 1954, p. 26? General James M. Doo-
lltrle. Ibid., 14 January 1954, p. 7.
°At a press conference on 13 January. For text see ibid ., 14 January
1954, p. 12.
1 7
lbid. , 18 January 1954, p. 1.
18lbld., 3 February 1954, p. 1.
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that the concept was not new.
Hanson Baldwin, military writer for the New York Times, detected on
element of risk In the overall program but held that It was justified in view of the
22
then decreased international tensions. And, reflecting the United States' legal-
istic heritage, Chester Bowles professed concern that the policy might usurp Congress 1




But one of the most complete denunciations of the New Look and the
policy of massive retaliation was mounted by ths 1952 Democratic Presidential can-
didate. In a speech before a party conference at Miami Beach Adlal Stevenson
described the new policy as a return to th© pre-Korean War strategy — a strategy
which was based on the assumption of a United States' atomic monopoly not existing
in 1954. JvWeover, he held that the country's freedom of action was restricted in-
asmuch as the alternative responses to aggression were either Inaction or full-scale
conflict. In fact, the policy invited counter-retaliation on the United States by
an enemy seeking to destroy the American weapons. And finally Mr. Stevenson was
critical of the cuts in the Army and Navy on the grounds that NATO would be
weakened and the country made less well-equipped to wage the cold war.
21 Ibid., B February 1954, p. 30. 22lbtd., 24 February 1954, p. 13.
23
In an article In the New York Times Magazine, tbld ., 28 February
1954, sec. VI, p. 11.
24















Secretory Wilson replied to tfils criticism by again emphasizing, the
New Look's overall balance. He did nor specifically deny the superficial simi-
larity of massive retaliation and pre-Korean War strategy but instead pointed out
that this was only a single element. The question that interested the Secretary
was the nature of Stevenson's qualifications as a military commentator.
And so It wont. Vice-President Nixon tried his hand at answering
Mr. Stevenson but in the mood of partisanship then prevailing succeeded in settling
27
very littfe.
Both Houses of Congress held hearings and the many genuine questions
raised by the implications of the New Look policy were over a period of several
months elicited, discussed, and explained. And at one of these sessions Secretary
Wilson characterized the policy as a 'natural evolution" from previous strategy,




Clarification of contingent United States' actions was a principal area
of the doubters' concerns. How, for example, could the concept of Instant retali-
ation be reconciled with the concept of consultation with allies? Mr. Dulles replied
to this as follows*.
If you will read my address of January 12, you will see what
I advocated there was a ' capacity to retaliate instantly. In no
26lbid., 10 March 1954, p. 1.
27
In a radio-TV address. Text In Ibid ., 14 March 1954, p. 44.
28
lbid., 16 March 1954, p. 1.




piaci did t soy we would retaliate Instantly, although we
might Indeed ratal lata instantly under conditions that coll
for that. . .
.29
Another question put to the Secretary was whether the 'our' In the
phase "by means and at places of our choosing 1 referred to the United States alone
or "the free community of nations. " And was Hie United States to determine the
meant? And In the case of a limited challenge in a remote area would the choice
be, as Mr. Stevenson had suggested, either all-out war or no resistance at all':'
To this last the Secretory replied by citing the declaration mo6e at
the time of Hie Korean armistice in which It was stated that 'if aggression should
be resumed that the reaction would not necessarily be confined to Korea. That does
not mean, he said, 'necessarily that there will be an effort made to drop atomic
30bombs on Peiping or upon Moscow. . . .
'
A "more polished' exposition of massive retaliation was prepared by
Secretary Dulles while enroute home from the Berlin Conference and appeared as an
article entitled "Policy for Security and Peace" in the April 1954 Issue of Foreign
Affairs. In it, practically all Hie criticisms of the doctrine were discussed and, in
the Secretary's mind, reconciled with Hie basic rationale.
As was the case with the New Look itself, massive retaliation could be
criticized because of its substance; It could not be criticized for failure to deal with
contingencies. But, as his biographer, John R. Baal, commented, It is doubtful
If many of the critics of Hie Dulles 'doctrine of deterrence, ' of which 'massive
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retaliation' was a port, bothered to read (that) complete spellout. . «
.
r
Similar questions w@ra asked at Presidential and other departmental
press conferences, as well as in the several concerned Congressional Committees,
and contemplation of the great majority doe* not reveal that the questions were
asked because of any fundamental misunderstanding of the policy.
By the first part of May interest In the great debate had begun to flag.
III. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
At the same time that the massive retaliation debate was In progress,
the first dynamic test of the New Look was developing in the field.
It will be recalled from Chapter III, above, that Mr. Dulles had mode
a speech In Paris, in May of 1952, which was directed specifically at the problem
of "Indirect aggression'
1 faced by the French in Indo-China. Then, local forces
under Ho Chi Mlnh were receiving support from Communist China In o guerrilla
war against the colonial French regime. There was a possibility of direct Chinese
participation. Mr. Dulles had viewed the problem th«n as one part of the greater
whole which was tho battle between the free world and the Communist world and
had advocated, In his capacity as a private citizen, that the Chinese be warned
lhat direct participation In Vietnam would be mot by 'retaliatory action of our own
fashioning."
31
* John Robinson Bed, John Foster Qui lest 1 £B6- 1959 (New York;
Harper and Brothers, 1957, 1959), p. IHI
32












ly January 1954, the situation In Vietnam — one of three Indo-
Chinese states — had deteriorated for the French to the point that material aid
was no longer capable of reversing the Communists' advantage. If Vietnam/ or
Indeed any part of Indo-Chlna, was to bs saved, a new method of bringing strength
to bear had to be fashioned.
It Is therefore not wholly coincidental that the speech delivered by
Secretary Dulles on 12 January 1954 should bear such a marked resemblance to
his addrsss on Indo-Chino some twenty months before. The only major difference
was the more general applicability of the later statement and the wider margin of
retaliatory strength which had accumulated in the interval. The massive retaliation
speech Inevitably raised the question, therefore, as to whether it would be applied
to Indo-China.
As this paper has attempted to show, there was no element of capri clous-
nest in the formulation of the New Look; nor was there any Intent to avoid the
always-present requirement to analyze discriminatingly each diplomatic situation
as a unique ®v&nf with its own implications, logic, and ramifications. Thus, while
Secretary Dulles' ideas about a deterrent doctrine had a definite origin, it would
be incorrect to attribute their reststamsnt to the then developing crisis In Indo-
China. Such a conclusion would ignore all the evidence indicating that the New
Look was the product of a sustained and joint effort by tha top officials of the
Administration. Doubtless the thinking of the Secretary of State had had great
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But the public world deals in superficial similarities and is generally
incapable of making the distinction that the same enemy can threaten two times
and that each threat must be treated as something unique. Nor can the public
appreciate that the responding units ~ the United States and the free world —
may be different personalities in succeeding crises.
Yet such considerations had, in 1954, a great deal to do with whether
Indo-Chlna was actually a test of the New Look or its massive retaliatory assumption.
At the same time, it is equally obvious that this capacity — or rather incapacity —
of the public to understand, and in understanding, to support, is a vital consider-
ation in determining the practicality of a policy.
As the Indo-Chlna crisis developed before the eyes of the world, the
case seemed simple enough. The French were — in certain areas of northern
Vietnam — in an increasingly untenable position. They did not have the confi-
dence and support of the local population and were unable to lure trie guerrillas
Into a confrontation In numbers — a situation that supposedly would hove favored
the French.
Adding to this not unusual guerrilla pattern was a costly French maneu-
ver that resulted in the isolation of their garrison at Dienbienphu. The size of the
force there was not large and the real estate had little tactical importance; but
the political significance was immense. It demonstrated that a sizable French force
with modern weapons could, under favorable circumstances, be engaged successfully
by guerrilla units.
Political instability in France, plus the poor military position in the field,








added up to a weak hand. And to make matters more difficult was the French burden
of their coloniai past — a crushing burden in this case
.
Although France was alone in Indo-China, American material aid hod
been and was being supplied and the prestige of the United States was very much
33
committed as a result of the Administration's anti-Communist aggression statements.
The "massive retaliation" speech had furthered this impression.
A final factor before the public was the knowledge that, as a result of
an agreement at the Berlin Conference in January 1954, the West had agreed to a
Five Power Conference in Geneva on the subject of Indo-Chinc. Defeat was in the
air and it seemed that nothing short of massive retaliation could affect this eventuality.
Inevitable speculation began as to the applicability of the "new strategy."
In February, James Weston reported that a "debate had bean going on quietly here
Qn Washington) for some weeks, but it has been brought to the fore in recent days by
developments in Indo-China, where the situation has continued to deteriorate and the
34
Government has found that its 'new strategy* cannot be applied. 1* This had resulted
in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee scheduling a meeting with Admiral Radford
and Under Secretary of State Waiter Bedell Smith "to discover precisely what the
Government's 'new strategy 1 means, where Congress* rights fit Into this strategy, and
35
how it is to be used in places such as Indo-China."
^On 23 March 1953, President Eisenhower had linked Indo-China to
Korea saying that United States security interests were concerned equally in the two
places. The New York Times, 24 March 1953, p. 1
.
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Obviously Seston was voicing the thoughts of others end just as ob-
viously the main point of these tttoughts was focused on the "massive" and "instant
retaliation" aspects of the new strategy. After quoting parts of Secretary Dulles'
12 January address which were relevant to that thesis he indicated the questions on
the minds of the Senators: "isn't this (jndo-China) a case for more 'dependence on
local power' rather than less? Isn't Red China threatening the security of the who.e
36
of Southeast Asia merely be sending limited supplies to the Communist Vietminh ?"
Certainly many people had thought of the Chinese aid as being direct
aggression but this was a construction not shared by world opinion which would have
been outraged at "prior massive retaliation."
As for local defense forces, a news article a wee< later, and just prior
to Secretory Dulles' closed-door testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
said:
Mr. Dulles will ask the senators to remember that he said in his
speech that local defensive power would always be important and
to note that — perhaps because of the threat in this policy — -_
Communist China has not moved into Indo-China as it did into Korea.
Actually, Reston appreciated the dilemma of the Administration for he
made the observation that "no worse test of its 'new strategy' could be imagined."
It (the Administration) was clear about whtf it was trying to do:
it was trying — and so far it has succeeded in doing so — to keep
Red China from moving into Indo-China in force, as the Peiping
regime did in Korea.
The Soviet Union was also being warned that it could not begin
another Korea without risking an all-out atomic attack on its own
installations. And there is considerable evidence that the Soviet
^Ibid. 37lbid., 22 February 1954, p. 1
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Union has paid attention to this and is avoiding any direct mili-
tary action to achieve its goals.
However, Hie problem is that the Communists in Indo-China
. . .are succeeding without Red Chinese or Soviet troops, and as
the United States places less dependence on "local defensive
power" the will to resist in Paris and Saigon is declining .og
This, of course, was to the point, tt could be debated, however, that
local defensive power such as the United States might have provided was relevant to
the situation.
Reston showed further insight into the actual complications that prevailed
in recollecting that the Secretary had said in the massive retaliation speech that "we
need allies and collective security." "But," he (Reston) went on, "nothing has been
said about whether the aiiies are willing to go along with the policy of 'instant re-
39
taliatory power' at places and with means of our own choosing." (The adjective
"own" was Reston 's addition to the paraphrase but It was indicative of the interpre-
tation some placed on Dulles' speech). In concluding his description of the dilemma,
Reston wisely observed that the real test of the strategy would occur "not only in Indo-
40
China but on Capitol Hill ."
But the real fact of the matter was that massive retaliation was not under
test at ail — for it was merely a contingent decision to be employed if it should be
found that deterrence had failed. Nor was it the New Look which was being tested:
the New Look was merely a military policy — albeit o crucial one — and in any case
was broad enough — from a policy standpoint -- to take into account whatever action
^Ibici., 15 February 1954, p. 1 . 39lbid.
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What was being tested was broader than United States military policy
or even its foreign policy; it was really a test of collective action by three major
states in the free world
.
Thus, when Great Britain refused to take part in discussions aimed to-
wards bringing United States air ond naval power into the conflict, the only con-
ditions under which Congressional leaders might have been willing to support United
States intervention were not met.
Settlement of the conflict went to Geneva with the French at a disad-
vantage which was sharply accented by Communist capture of Dienbienphu during
41
the course of the talks. Indo-China and Dienbienphu were simply illustrative of
42
what Hanson Baldwin termed "the limitations" of the policy.
Such an appraisal obviously is unsatisfactory to the many who felt that
the public had been sold a bill of goods designed to help Administration fiscal
43
policy. But these critics would do well to remember that a crucial factor in the
employment of power is the willingness to use it under appropriate circumstances* In
41
This thesis is propounded in Beat, op. c?t . , Chapter 19, "Indochina:
A Different Brink." The contrary position, that Indo-China was a United States policy
failure, Is taken by far more writers. For example, Thomas K . Finietter, Power and
Policy (Mew York; Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954), p. 148, says: "The timing of the
destruction of the garrison at Dienbienphtr was a slap In the face of the West. It gave
the massive retaliation policy as good a casus belli as it is lively to have. . . . In its
first test in the Gray Areas, at Dienbienphu, it failed."
42jh* N«* York T?m<s ' !o Mqy ,954 ' *•• IV, p. 5
.
As has been noted, the idea that the Administration's duol concerns —
for solutions to both the military and economic sides of what Huntington calls the















the Indo-China casa a consensus of willingness was absent among the allies; and,
just as importantly, it was absent in Congress and in the public. Willingness on
the part of the President, the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs' Chairman
would have amounted to irresponsibility if ?t were to fly in the face of such cm
objective fact.
Naturally there were demands that the Administration revamp its military
policies in Hie light of tha Indo-China failure. President Eisenhower, Secretary
Dulles, and Admiral Radford, however, stoutly d&ftnd«d their long-haul 1 policy
44
and refused to concede the necessity for revision. Nor was this stubborness.
President Eisenhower had explicitly refected Ate illusion of total security' and an
often-overlooked paragraph in Secretary Dulles' controversial speech revealed a
similar pragmatic vein:
it is normal that at some times and at some places there may be
setbacks to the cause of freedom. V hat we do expect to insure is
that any setbacks will have only temporary and local significance,
because they will k-ovs unimpaired those free world assets which in
the long run will prevail. If we can deter such aggression as would
mean general war, and that is our constant resolve, then we can let
time and fundamentals work for us (emphasis suppliecD.^r
recurrent theme In New Look criticism. €ven as late as 1959, an impressive group of
scholars, In stating that ' the purposes of the new look were as much economic as
military, ' dear!) implied that the two concerns should not be regarded as equal.
United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Sslations, "Developments in
Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy,
"
United States Foreign Policy: Compilation of Studies (Washington: Government
Anting Wee, \m, p. 7>1 .
**News item in the New York Times, 12 May 1954, p. 1.
45




While the New Look did remain the tarn* in concept there were, after
Dienbienphu, changes in emphasis of its features. Robert Osgood notes that Dulles'
spoke of America's retaliatory power less frequently and more prudently, while
stressing its flexibility and selectivity. And President Elsenhower counseled
47
"coexistence and o modus vivendi »
IV. POLICY ADJUSTMENTS
As a military policy, the New Look continued to guide the Adminis-
tration's efforts to achieve security and stability throughout fiscal years 1955 and
1956 and even served as the basis for preparation of the FY 1957 defense budget.
The period was characterized by steady movement towards fulfillment
of the original Joint Chiefs of Staff goals (of December 1953) — that is, development
of continental defense; decrease in size of conventional ground forces; marked devel-
opment of an integration of nuclear weapons of assorted types; improvement of the
41
Reserves' state of readiness; and expansion of strategic air power.
The decision to expend a considerable effort towards the attainment of
a continental defense system was pursued despite charges by some that the Adminis-
tration was failing to take into account an undeniable fact — that the Soviet Union
also had the hydrogen bomb. To air power proponents this was supposed to mean
that only by doubling or trippHng the size of the Strategic Air Command could the
^Robert E . Osgood, Limited War (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1957), p. 226.
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Ibid. Huntington, op.cit., pp. 78-84.


















United States count on preserving Iti margin of nuclear superiority. therwise,
a Soviet surprise first strike might succeed in destroying the United states' retalia-
tory force
.
A different set of conclusions was drawn by limited war advocates. To
these latter, the mutual possession of hydrogen weapons by the two great powers
meant a nuclear standoff: limited war by conventional weapons and forces became
50
the great danger . To both groups, investment in a continental defense system was
a waste of effort
.
Actually it appears that the Administration did take into account Soviet
H-bomb development. But it should be remembered that defense planners pay more
attention to what an enemy does with his knowledge and resources than what he
could do it he were to concentrate on a single aspect of his military posture . Thus,
it is possible to conclude, as Huntington has, that the development of United States
continental defense — notably its air defense — was intended to counterbalance
*.Sov..tbUi,d-Upofo,^9icairf rc..
5 '
Also, It can be said that the possibility of limited war was also provided
for in the New Look assumption that tactical nuclear weapons would be used in
appropriate circumstances. A White House advisor was quoted, in this regard, as
*Tor example: MoiorAiexanderP.de Seversky, the New York Times
,
4 January 1954, p. 5 and 15 August 1954, p. 60; T. K . Finletter, Ibid., 30 September
1954, p. 14.
In particular, General Mathew Ridgway, Army C/S. See news items,
ibid. , 10 April 1954, p. 16; 31 August 1954, p. 5; and 10 September 1954, p. 5.
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fallows:
The President mode it clear from the beginning that defense
strategy plans were to recognize the existence of atomic weapons
and the fact they would be used if 090696 .... He was very clear
on the point that strategy and budgets be developed on this
decision.,. -
Reduction of manpower levels from 3,500,000 to 2,900,000 had been
one of the JCS recommendations in December 1953 but how unanimous their thinking
was came into doubt two years later when 09r>mra\ Ridgway denied his "acceptance"
53
of that decision. Nonetheless, implementation proceeded and the goal was
reached by June 1956 instead of June 1957.
Again, the thinking was tied directly to the New Look assumptions that
new weapons and increased firepower would make up for the manpower superiority
of the Soviet bloc . The Korean War was over and the Indo-China crisis had empha-
sized the unwillingness of the Administration to participate in a similar venture —
at least as regards the manner in which the fighting would have likely b%9n conducted
Following the crisis in Indo-China references were made by both the President and
the Defense Secretary which indicated a concern for development of the centrally
54
located mobile strategic reserve of troops. But this development was handicapped
by the inability to withdraw units from NATO and by the necessity of keeping forces
in Korea
.
52Cired injbid., p. 80.
53
See news item in the New York Times, 17 January 1956, p. 1;
Ridgwoy's comments were in an article written for tBi Saturday Evening post .
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While in theory/ mobility, weapons, and firepower were to compen-
sate for a reduction of forces, critics were later to associate the decrease in
ground forces with an absence of flexibility of response, or, in other words, an
inadquate capability to wage limited war. But this argument is somewhat theo-
retical also for it neglects to take into account the fact that such a capability was
not completely lacking and was in fact considerable. The significant relationship
is that of capability to degree of threat — an argument that revolves not about
logic but about judg ment and one in which the Administration must be the final
judge.
In introducing nuclear weapons into a broad spectrum of military uses
the problems of technological development and service acceptability were rela-
tively minor ones. The major difficulty was a diplomatic one — that of integrating
them into NATO's forces. This was accomplished by the end of 1954 and amounted
to bringing "NATO strategy into line with American strategy at\6 authorizing) . .
.
SHAPE to base its military planning on the assumption that nuclear weapons would
55
be used in future conflict. "
The idea of a large reserve of trained manpower ran counter to Secre-
tary Wilson's desire to emphasize present capabilities rother than a broad mobili-
zation base . Thus, he was not interested in expending large sums on the reserves.
However, when manpower cuts led General Rldgway to the conclusion that the
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favor more attention to Hie reserves rather than to accept the financial burden of
56
more manpower. Thus,, the size of the active reserve nearly doubled to one
million men by the and of the original New Look period.
Despfta Its theoretical balance and flexibility, the whole logic of the
New Look inevitably led to a massive emphasis on air power. Mobility of forces
depended on air transport. Tho tactical employment of troops required the increased
firepower of close air support in order to maximlza their effectiveness. Tactical
nuclear weapons were, for the most part, airborne. And the security of naval forces
at sea depended on a great capacity to control the skies over the seas. But above
ail, the final demand for air power was to provide the means of delivering nuclear
weapons on strategic targets. This last was tha air retaliatory power which the
New Look assumed as the necessary means for deterring anemy aggression.
It is difficult to see how any strategy could hove avoided a substantial
development of this deterrent force inasmuch as ail of the experience of past military
campaigns has demonstrated the utter impossibility of ignoring the development of
weapons to their logical ultimate. Not to do so is to risk losing the technological
Initiative to the enemy — an awesome risk in the face of a fast-changing technology.
The New Look air retaliatory power emphasis simply added on to this requirement.
The 1 14 wing Interim goal of FY 1954 was gradually upped until It reached the level
of 137 wings, slated for 30 June 1957. This compared favorably with ths pre-New





siderably different role for air power. As Huntington has put it:
The actions and declarations of Hie Truman Administration
had indicated that strategic retaliation with nuclear weapons
would be a response only to a major attack upon western Europe
or North America. The doctrine of massive retaliation raised
the possibility that this capacity might be used to respond to
less critical attacks in other parts of this world..-
It has been said earlier that the New Look was a conscientious effort fo
balance an equation that has been described elsewhens as c 'competition of purposes.'
This competition ". . .is not fust among the broad goals of policy but also among the
specific goals of. . .particular groups and between specific goals anc brocd goals. ""'
The New Look reflected the competition between fiscal stability and
military security. Within the confines of the policy there was the further competition
of programs as interested groups sought to maximize both their roles and their capacities
to fulfill assigned missions.
Thus, the equation could remain in balance only so long as the general
assumptions, on which stability hod first been achieved, remained the same. By
early 1956, instability was threatening the New Look.
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THE DECLINE OF THE NEW LOCK
Perhaps, In the manner of an Hegelian dialectic, the period of ten-
tative and approximate equilibrium which characterized tha first two years of ttvs
New Look gave rise to Its own antithesis. At any rate, the early stability did give
wo)-. The development and generation of new forces produced a disequilibrium that,
in the very least, required policy adjustments. This was the more striking because,
although its birth-pangs had generated an enormous controversy over Its assumptions,
rationale an<*. purposes, the New Look, nurtured on the steadfastness and persistence
of the Administration, had gone on to achieve an unusual, If superficial, harmony.
Because of the progress it was making towards Its goals it was possible
to prepare, In the Fall of 1955, th<2 defense budget for FY 1957, In an atmosphere
of satisfaction and calm. 'Stability was the great theme of that budget, ' writes
Huntington. The competition of purposes between the two variables of the
"equation' — security and fiscal soundness — at last appeared to be leading towards
the sought-for balance. 'Security, hannony, economy, stability all seemed within
reach ,
See the New York Times, 3 January 1956. p. 72. A news Item re-
ported that Pzntaaor*. fiscal offT«::-r? sa>v at itc&flfzed the U, S. defense program,
"barring major changes In international affairs. "
Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York? The Columbia
University Press, 1961), p. 97*
3lbld., p. 88.
--'_.'






The external manifestations that all was not well with the New Look
had two inter-related aspects. First wot the development In early 1956 of one of
the most bitter of al! Inter-servics disputes. The point at lsso<* wto the increasing
realization by the Army that its deterrent role (for less than all-out conflict) was
being sacrificed in the interest of a greater massive retaliatory capability. Bvf Hie
heart of the Army's dissatisfaction was that it had never been enthusaistic about two
of the New Look's original assumptions: that significant changes would not take
place in the Soviet-American power ration and that massive retaliatory power would
defer limited as well as all-out war.
These assumptions, however, were in the nature of judgments handed
down by the highest deliberative body on security policy — the National Security
Council with the President of the United States as its senior member. To contradict
those decisions could serve no purpose inasmuch as the pros and cons had already been
discussed, evaluated, an<ii decided; disagreement would hove been just that —
disagreement.
However, as the months passed, evidence began to build up that the
original assumptions were indeed becoming invalid. Russia was known to have explo-
ded a thermonuclear device; at a May Day parade in 1955, fifteen new Soviet jet
bombers (the Bison) were flown over Red Square; intelligence seemed to indicate
Soviet success in missile development; ond more than anything it just seemed logical
















I a : ;;




Thai* were developments of which the public was aware, but the
Eisenhower Administration, like the Truman Administration before the Korean War,
5
was in basic harmony with the prevailing public and congressional view. * That
is to say, the public had the uneasy knowledge that the credibility of massive re-
taliation was in douht but preferred, nonetheless, the stability of the New took.
They preferred to contemplate a 'balance of terror' rather than accept involvement
in limited wars on the ground of the building up of a large standing army.
The Army, however, did not accept the continuation of planning based
on the original New Look assumptions. And, strange to say, the Air Force did not
view as sufficient, its already predominant role as a consumer of the military budget.
Thus, in presenting a 'stabilized defense program in his January 1956
State of the Union Message, President Eisenhower was in the position of using his
executive authority to contain a significant amount of underlying discordance. This
discordance broke into the open on "16 January — Hie same day that the budget
outlined in detail the Administration's FY 1957 defense program — with the
publication, in the Saturday evening fost, of General Ridgway's hostile challenge
6
to the emphasis on nuclear weapons and airpower.
The debate that followed was bitter and continued into the Summer. Both
the Army and the Air Force circulated staff papers in support of their respective
7
positions and ' news leaking " continued apace. Secretary of Defense Wilson put
Robert E, Osgood, limited War (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1957), p. 232.
^ee the New York Times , 1 7 January 1956, p. 3
.
7
lbld., 19 May 1956, p. 1.






the lid' on by taking the highly unusual step of assembling the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and all of the Service Secretaries en bloc for a press conference in which they
were forced to epeak words of harmony.
Rut barely a month ioter the dispute was back in tha open with the Army
both criticizing Air Force "short nuclear war ! doctrine and advocating a single chief
of staff.
£ven Chairman Kurshchev tried to keep the ball rolling: at a reception
for Air Force Chief of Staff Twining in Moscow he questioned the logic of having a
Navy man (Admiral Radford) as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
However, the most immediate consequence of the controversy was ironic:
ex-Air Force Secretary Symington, as head of a Senate Armed Services subcommittee,
held a series of "Airpower* hearings that resulted in the Senate adding $900 million
in unasked-for funds to the Air Force budget.
Such visible manifestations of dissatisfaction did not however, accurately
reflect other forces which already were at work. For the very budget message that
had marked the beginning of the Air Force-Army controversy had contained a signifi-
cant change in the emphasis given domestic programs:
This marked the beginning of a 50 percent rise In domestic Federal
expenditures over the next five years, a rise in which Hie Administration
acquiesced reluctantly but which numerous critics argued was still not
sufficient to meet the need for public services. Second, prices. .
.
started to move up In J956. . . . The cumulative effect of these. . .factors
8 Ibid., 22 May 1956, p. 1. 9jbfd. , 24 June 1956, p. 1.
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was a strong incentive to keep military expenditures at the mini-
mum consistent with a reasonable degree of national security. '*
Thus, the pinch on the military was inevitably to become, greater. But
this was to take place within a new cycle of decisions and policymaking based on
different assumptions and calling for somewhat different goals. This was the 'New-
New Look' and its 'dominant features' were:
. . .continuing efforts to stabilize military expenditures. . .down-
grading of mobilization potential and reserve forces... acceptance
of a future retaliatory capability sufficient, but only sufficient, to
deter a direct attack on American. . .vital interests; and. . .a slowly
growing recognition of the n&sd to maintain capabilities for limited
wor.^
With the passage of time and the change of circumstances, the New took
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Four conclusions on the non-substantlv® aspects of the New Look military
policy stand out.
First, from a theoretical and conceptual point of view it had Internal
consistency;
Second, the policy was highly integrated into the overall thinking about
<tnc\ planning of national strategy;
Third, #19 Administration's efforts to gain public acceptance of the New
Look were characterized by candor and unusual persistence; ond
Fourth, the conduct of the Administration-public dialogue illustrated that
many of the problems of public debate are of a continuing nature.
Theoretical and Conceptual Consistency
Much of the substantive criticism of the New Look was directed towards
the manner in which it took into account what was held to ba the then-existing
realities. Still more criticism was in the nature of disagreement with Its premises, Hie
basic decisions which wsre Its operating assumptions.
Thus in the first instance, ther^ was a continuing attack against the pro-
grams of the New Look on the grounds that th$y were inadequate to achiavc their
stated purposes. For example, air power proponents wantod an expanded massive re-
taliatory capability while ground power advocates argued that tbs strong mobile con-
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In the second instance, the New Look was challenged on the grounds
that the assumptions were either Incorrect or unacceptable. For example, it was
held that the Soviet-American power ratio would change or had, in fact, already
changed and also that thenuclear deterrent would not operate to prevent limited
war.
As for the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used tactically,
it was argued that this would inevitably lead to escalation and genera! war.
However, ail of this had little to do with the logical consistsncy of the
policy. The important point was that the general situation had been taksn Into ac-
count, a course of action rationalized and decisions mads. The substantive criticism
may or may not have been valid: the decisions may have been unpalatable, the
assumptions may hove been incorrect. But, nonetheless, the policy was theoretically
and conceptually consistent.
Policy Integration
A great deal of criticism of the New Look centered about the charge that
security was being sacrificed In the interests of economic stability. Again, this is a
question of substantive values. It is significant to this ttudy that the relationship of
the economy to overall security was faced openly and a decision tnade to seek a balance
There Is no question that the course chosen was considered to be the national interest
as best the Administration could determine it.
The decision to balance ' the equation, " then, formed the basis for policy
at all levels — foreian, domestic, and military. Illustrative of this wos the holding
of non-military budget increases to a minimum until the FY 1957 budget was presented.
'itoioonu ftec cj *
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Also, foreign aid received Its greatest amphosh In arsas that enhanced the nation's
security. And the military was made dependent on the supposedly lew expensive
nuclear deterrent In order to provide the 'maximum security at a bearable co$t»"
Public Information Effort
Again and again the Slsenhower Administration was charged with the
suppression of reports ond intelligence -stlmates that were purportedly unfavorable to
the goals of balancing rhs military-economic aquation and of ths Hew Look. For
example, Senator Symington's subcommittee hearings on air power were highly criti-
cal of the nation's nuclear deterrent on ths grounds that the imminent development
of Soviet strategic air power rmdzmd necessary a great increase in the United States
Air Force's Strategic Air Command. And the Oalther Committee made far-reaching
recommendations for a new defense posture. The Administration played down both
and it later turned out that the intelligence used In both cases was inaccurate.
Thus, it must be assumed that the decision* of the Administration had a
perspective not shared by «orae of their critics, even though their (the critics) Intelli-
gence reports may in some cases have had an official origin.
The statements of President Eisenhower, Secretory of State Dulles, Secre-
tary of Defense Wilson, an6 Joint Chief's Chairman Admiral Radford were remarkably
similar In substance. Fiscal stability, an economy-security balance, preponderant
United States' strength, and overall military balance were continually cited. Showing
through in all the: -!cs was a towering confidence and islf-assurance that things









Grid might have disagreed with the military policy arid felt uneasy
about the Nation's security but at least there was no doubt as to what the policy
was. If It is a duty of democratic governments to inform the people sufficiently to
allow responsible and intelligent discussion, it seems that this requirement was never
ducked or evaded — ai laast, not successfully.
Implications of the Public Dialogue
Verbal dynamism during the Now Look period was enormous and yet the
trend of debate showed that a dialectic does not produce a new synthesis on the basis
of words alone. In tho final analysis it is the objective factors, as weighed in the
minds of those responsible, which determine if there Is to he a new synthesis . Yet
public acceptance Is one of those object!v© factor* and the longer a policy is opera-
tive the more likely that acceptance or rejection will be determined independently by
members of the public rather than an elite. But at the same time, over the long haul
special Interest groupt can more effectively organize *•» a fact that is said to favor
interest groups rathsr than group interests.
In retrospect, the dialogue was untidy and It Is doubtful that anyone was
wholly satisfied with the course Jt followed. The public never seemed to be convinced
of their safety and the government never cou!d be sure of the public'* support. It can
be said that there was a tentatlveness all around with respect to the policy. This was
furthered by those critics who conjectured "bomber gaps'' or limited war, both of
which, It was argued, madk the New Look, obsolete. And it Is interesting that the





despite the fact that the bomber gap (and Its missile gap sequel) proved a fiction and
the danger of a ubfantlai limited war during the yean 1956-1960 appeared to be
more a theoretical than a real possibility.
Whether or not th« objective facts which governed the assumption* of
the New Look had changed or whether they were only thought to hava changed is not,
however, of major significance. The effect In either cos© was the same and one Is led
to wonder If this was not due in part to an erosion of will within the Administration
under the continuous assault by interest groups. The Administration's defense was
certalniy persistent but it Involved a large diversion of effort, particularly for those
officials called upon to testify before Congressional committees and subcommittee*.
The experience could have been debilitating.
In sum, the experience of the New look was one of extraordinary inter-
play between government one? public. And, as ha? been *ald, this was not a happy
fact for the participants on either side. But it may be that in the concern for effec-
tive policy the necessity for a healthy, vital democratic -.ubrtructure h -ometimes
overlooked.
If this is true the Interplay and dialogue fostered by the New Look have
a deeper meaning. It could be, as Professor John Dewey once argued, that this was
the kind of public participation that in fact H the difference between a democratic
society and a state that merely had democratic Institutions. It Is an argument In which
the writer concur?.
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